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ABSTRACT
The temporal dimensions of emotions have received insufficient
attention in the psychological literature. In particular, the duration
and the course of events in emotions have not been systematically
examined. The present thesis seeks to address this gap in the litera-
ture by means of a conceptual and empirical exploration of the duration
of anger, and an empirically-based study of other temporal features of
anger with particular emphasis on its termination.
The major traditions in the psychological study of emotions are
examined with regard to their treatment of temporal dimensions. An
important source of difficulty is identified in a widespread but here-
tofore unrecognized conceptual confusion: the traditional theories
founder when they attempt to apply inherently momentary, temporally-
bound, "occurrent" concepts to features of emotions which are extended
in time. A rectification of this conceptual confusion is proposed,
employing the philosophical concept of a disposition. This account of
emotions as time-limited psychological dispositions is refined through
an application of the social-psychological concept of an episode.
Questionnaire data bearing on relevant aspects of everyday episodes
of anger are reported; the duration of respondents' anger, the differ-
ential features of short-term and long-term anger, and the factors
responsible for the termination of anger are discussed from a "social
constructivist" perspective on emotions.
Finally, the implications of the present study for the further
development of theory and research on emotions are briefly assessed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Like many other objects of psychological investigation, emotions
occur over time; accordingly, most theories conceptualize emotions as
some sort of process , rather than as static variables or entities.
However, rarely in the long history of the psychological study of emo-
tions has the duration of emotions been singled out as a topic worthy
of sustained attention and discussion. One may peruse the major
theoretical treatments of emotion without encountering more than a very
few specific treatments of the duration of either particular emotions
or emotions in general. For the most part, the issue of the duration of
emotions has been made subsidiary to theorists' assumptions and commit-
ments as to the essential nature of emotion, an area of great diversity
and controversy. Most or all of the positions which have been taken
on the essential nature of emotions have implications for their duration,
but these implications have rarely been explicated and explored, nor have
they been empirically tested. In fact, the entire temporal dimension
of emotions— the course and sequence of their unfolding in time, and the
temporal features of their internal dynamics and of their relations with
other psychological phenomena, as well as their simple duration—remains
obscure.
The present study addresses this gap in the psychological litera-
ture by means of a concrete exploration of the duration of one of the
most prevalent and important emotions in everyday human affairs— anger.
1
2This exploration begins with the simple inquiry, "How long does anger
typically last?", a question which is attended by a wide variety of
conceptual, theoretical and empirical issues, and thus provides an
occasion for the consideration of a range of important topics. We
will find that this simple question admits of no simple answer, or
rather that its simple answer raises a series of more complex and chal-
lenging questions. The theoretical inattention to the duration of
emotions has not been an arbitrary oversight; the topic requires that
one confront certain of the most intractable and evasive issues in the
study of emotions.
Not all that may be said regarding the temporal characteristics of
anger can be applied to all emotions equally. Generalizations regarding
emotions are notoriously unreliable, so much so that some authors have
been led to maintain that emotions, as we commonly consider them, do not
form a natural or coherent category at all (Rorty, 1980; Mandler, 1979).
However, anger is what might be termed a "classic" emotion; that is,
while it may not be representative of all emotions in all respects, no
one is likely to regard it as marginal to, or atypical of, emotions in
general. Moreover, anger brings together many of the most interesting,
consequential, and problematic features of emotions: it is interpersonal,
involves both cognitions and physiology, is complexly normative, is
relevant to action and even potentially dangerous, has political and
legal aspects, and so on. Thus, it provides a fruitful focus for any
concrete investigation of emotions.
In the present chapter we will review some of the major theoretical
outlooks on emotion with a focus on how each one addresses (or fails to
3address) the temporal dimension. We will encounter a variety of concep-
tual difficulties in this review; one which recurs in various forms in
most theories of emotion will be taken up in the subsequent section of
the chapter, and a resolution of the difficulty will be proposed. Then,
a logical framework for understanding individual "episodes" of emotion
will be offered, with particular reference to anger. This framework
will provide the foundation for aspects of the design of the empirical
portion of the present study and for discussion of the results. The
present chapter will conclude with an overview of the study.
Duration of Emotions in Major Theories
The physiological tradition . Virtually every psychological account of
emotions has included physiology as an important component; indeed, this
might almost serve as a sufficient means of distinguishing psychological
from philosophical accounts. So strong has this tendency been in psych-
ology that most undergraduate courses in emotion, or "emotion and motiva-
tion," are taught by physiological psychologists using a predominantly
physiological array of concepts (Averill, 1974).
Human beings are physically embodied beings, and every phenomenon
described by psychologists must necessarily have physical--i .e. , physio-
logical—correlates in some fashion. So for a theory to state that
emotions are largely or primarily physiological in nature in fact says
nothing about either the theory or about emotions, and to include all
theories which describe emotions in physiological terms in this consider-
ation of the physiological tradition would yield a grouping too hetero-
geneous for the present purposes. Of more direct interest are those
4theories— relatively few in number—which define emotion consistently
and exclusively in physiological terms and regard cognitive activity
or subjective experience as epiphenomenal and theoretically irrelevant.
In the literature such theories often appear under the rubric "peri-
pheralist," as opposed to the "centralist" theories which, while still
physiological in a broader sense, provide a place for experience and
consciousness by incorporating the "higher centers" of the brain-
cortical areas such as the limbic system— into the emotion process
(e.g., Cannon, 1927; Papez, 1937; MacLean, 1980). It will be useful to
focus here on the more narrowly physiological theories in order to more
clearly discern their implications for duration—which are, even with
this restriction, less than uniform.
Wenger (1950) will serve as a representative of the strictly
physiological outlook. He defines emotion as "visceral action," and
specifies further that
Emotion is activity and reactivity of the tissues and organs
innervated by the autonomic nervous system. It may involve,
but does not necessarily involve, skeletal muscular response
or mental activity. (Wenger, Jones and Jones, 1956, p. 343)
By way of clarity, this definition would seem to leave little to be
desired, and Wenger is admirably consistent in applying it, to the
point of counting exercise and sleep as emotions. There is, however,
an anomaly hidden in the definition which leads to conflicting implica-
tions regarding duration (or it may be that the influence runs in the
other di recti on—contradicti on in the ordinary concept of emotion may
underlie the anomaly in the theoretical definition). The autonomic
nervous system is always active to some extent, and this must imply,
5on Wenger's definition of emotion, that one is always, from birth until
death, in some sort of emotional state. Indeed, emotion has often been
thought of in this way, by psychologists at any rate: as a kind of
background arousal, fluctuating in degree and perhaps in quality. How-
ever, we also commonly—perhaps more commonly--think of emotions as
occurring in discrete episodes with a concrete beginning and end. In
applying his definition, Wenger vascillates between referring to activity
of the ANS and change in activity— the latter being more temporally-bound—
and he vascillates likewise in referring to emotional change and, simply,
emotion. Thus, certain features of autonomic activity make it impossible
to deduce with any assurance what a "visceral action" theory of emotion
must hold regarding the duration of emotion.
It might be objected that, Wenger's particular vascil lations not-
withstanding, a physiological theorist might settle on the view that
emotions are particular patterns of autonomic activity, and that an emo-
tion endures for as long as a particular pattern persists. Leaving
aside the question of whether it is possible to identify distinct
patterns of physiological arousal which correspond to everyday emotions—
a topic much in dispute (Cannon, 1927; Schachter, 1964)— such a view
would not provide unequivocally for the duration of emotions. One
would have to specify fairly precisely what demarcates one pattern of
ANS activity from another; in order to avoid an excessive degree of
circularity this would have to be accomplished more or less independently
of the observed duration of emotions. This specification would be
further complicated by the different temporal features of the two main
components of ANS activity: the nervous system and the endocrine system.
6Finally, as we shall see in our discussion of emotions as dispositions,
no conception of episodes of emotion as enduring patterns of physiologi-
cal activity can easily accommodate an emotion, such as anger, which
quite commonly lasts more than a few minutes or hours.
Facial feedback theories
.
For some time, investigators have approached
the nature of emotion via studies of observers' judgments of facial
expressions, in particular the "dimensionality" of such judgments
(Schlosberg, 1954; Woodworth and Schlosberg, 1955; Osgood, 1966; Frijda,
1969). Somewhat more recently, theorists have implicated facial expres-
sions crucially in the emotion process, even to the point of asserting
that the face is perhaps the most important source of emotional experi-
ence (Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1971, 1977; Leventhal
, 1974, 1979; Ekman,
1960). Izard is perhaps the foremost present-day advocate of this posi-
tion in its more straightforward form, and a passage from his more
recent book should serve to illustrate it:
An internal or external event, as processed by the selectivity
and organizing functions of relevant receptors changes the
gradient of neural stimulation and the pattern of activity
in the limbic system and sensory cortex. Impulses from either
the cortex or from limbic structures (probably the thalamus)
are directed to the hypothalamus, which plays a role in
emotion differentiation, determining what facial expression
will be effected Finally, the cortical integration of
facial -expression feedback generates the subjective experience
of emotion. (Izard, 1977, p. 59)
Facial feedback plays its role in emotion activation in a rapid
reflexive fashion and awareness of facial activity or facial
feedback is actually our awareness of the subjective experience
of a specific emotion. (Ibid., p. 60)
Drawing on the studies of Ekman which demonstrate the cross-cultural
recognizability of certain facial expressions (Ekman, Friesen and
7Ellsworth, 1972), Izard concludes that for each of the "fundamental"
emotions--for Izard these number ten--there exists an innate neuroloai-
cal template which produces a specific pattern of facial muscular
activity in response to a pre-programmed set of eliciting conditions.
The "proprioceptive and cutaneous" sensations resulting from this muscu-
lar activity are then integrated into the subjective experience of
emotion.
Izard provides certain alternatives to this process for even funda-
mental emotions, and in response to an empirical challenge to the facial
feedback hypothesis (Tourangeau and Ellsworth, 1979) he has de-emphasized
facial expression still further (Izard, 1981). These qualifications
notwithstanding, the tradition exemplified by Izard and Tomkins gives
preeminent importance to the face in the experience of emotion.
What does such a position imply about the duration of emotion? At
first blush one might suppose that since the patterning of facial
activity to which these authors refer is typically rather brief—even
"micromomentary"--then emotions, for them, must likewise typically last
for only a matter of seconds. However, such a conclusion would thoroughly
contradict our everyday conception and experience of emotion, and the
theorists, accordingly, do not assert that emotions are typically this
brief. Instead, they tend to maintain that facial expression is necessary
for the initiation of emotion but not for the sustaining of emotion.
Izard, for example, in introducing the first passage cited above, states:
Differential emotions theory postulates the continual
presence of emotion in consciousness. Therefore, the
following description of the emotion process applies to
the activation and experiencing of a new emotion.
(Izard, 1977, p. 59)
8Izard again emphasizes this point in his reply to Tourangeau and
Ellsworth:
Even a properly stated facial feedback hypothesis would be
concerned only with emotion activation, something that
occupies only milliseconds in an emotion process that may
last for a relatively long period of time and have substan-
tial influences on cognitive and motor processes. (Izard,
1 981
)
What, then, is this "relatively long period of time?" Izard does
not say, and he provides little from which one might deduce it. In
contrast with his detailed neuro-anatomical elaboration of the initiation
of emotion, Izard provides virtually no account of what comprises an
emotion over the majority of its duration, beyond suggesting that it
might reside in the "activity of the striate muscles of the body and
the smooth muscles of the viscera" (1977, p. 60). Moreover, there are
no more than hints as to what might bring about the termination of an
emotional state. Presumably, this would result from the activation of
a contradictory, or simply more intense, emotion; Izard does not specify.
Leventhal (1979) has elaborated a theory of emotion which, while
agreeing with Izard's that the "primary" emotions depend on pre-programmed
patterns of facial activity, provides more systematically for other
factors. Like Izard, Leventhal is vague regarding the duration of emo-
tions. In part this is due, as in Izard, to the fact that a primary
role in emotions is accorded to facial expressions, which are inherently
too brief to be co-terminous with emotions as we know them. In addition,
Leventhal is vague as to the definition of emotion, or, rather, the
demarcation of the emotion per se from what accompanies it. At first,
Leventhal seems to be acknowledging extension in time as a critical
9feature of emotions:
The model we are proposing is a processing model, i.e.,
it pictures the construction or building, over time, of
emotional experience. Because the constructive process is
extended in time, we can describe it as a series of staqes.
(1979, p. 15)
These stages are the "perceptual -motor stage" and the "planning-action
stage." In a diagram of the model — in the perceptual -motor stage,
specifical ly--we find a box labeled "emotion," which throws into ques-
tion whether the emotion is constituted by the entire process (as the
introductory paragraph would indicate) or whether it is only a nodal
point within the process. 1 As long as this confounding of levels of
abstraction is unresolved it is difficult to specify the theory's posi-
tion regarding the duration of emotions.
In summary, facial feedback theories of emotion are compelled, by
the emphasis they place on inherently brief facial expressions, to be
vague and non-committal as regards the duration of emotions. In order
to accommodate the data to be presented in the current study, facial
feedback theorists must provide a tenable and conceptually-coherent
account of the composition of emotions beyond the initial "milliseconds."
Psychoanalytic theory
.
Psychoanalytic thought has developed in a set
of distinct and competing schools: Jungian, Kleinian and British
Object Relations, the Lacanian "structuralist" version, the Sullivanian
"interpersonal ist" version, American Object Relations, Kohut's "Self
Psychology," and so on. For our present purposes the American "ego-
psychology movement, led by Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein and Rapaport,
is the most germane; it has for some decades exercised a wide influence
10
in American analytic thought, and it has emphasized the refinement of
Freud's metapsychological theory more than any other school. Rapaport
(1953) outlined the development and then-current status of the psycho-
analytic theory of affects, and this paper remains one of the most
important statements of the theory, in the present section we will
summarize Rapaport' s presentation of Freud, and discuss a relevant
aspect of Rapaport 's own synthesis.
Rapaport isolates three phases in the development of the psycho-
2
analytic theory of affects. In the first phase, during Freud's collab-
oration with Breuer and before the publication of The Interpolation of
Dreams , affect was not distinguished from psychic energy in general.
The second phase dates from the writing of The Interpretation of Dreams ,
in which Freud begins to conceive of affect more specifically as a form
of discharge of psychic energy (libido) and to distinguish this form of
discharge from that achieved through action on external reality. As
this phase was consolidated, affect came to be viewed as the discharge
of a determinate portion of the drive-energy attached to a particular
object; this portion was termed the "affect-charge." According to
Rapaport, however, Freud's conception of the affect-charge was a purely
"dynamic" one, and was inadequate compared with the refinements made
possible by the later "structural" development of the metapsychological
theory. Specifically, Freud regarded affects strictly as episodically-
activated processes of discharge, while unconscious ideas were viewed
as the bearers of sustained drive-energy. The repression of affect,
then, consisted for Freud of the blocking of certain internal channels
(secretory and circulatory) for the discharge of drive-tension; the
11
drive-tension itself remained accumulated on the unconscious idea. The
affect-charge portion of a drive-cathexis, on this view, is merely that
portion of the energy which can be carried off by the available dis-
charge channels. Affect has no actual existence when active discharge
is not underway; it is merely the potential for discharge (through a
particular avenue). Rapaport, on the other hand, insists that affects
have an actual, on-going existence in the psyche, in the form of the
affect-charge, which is kept in place, as it were, by discharge thresh-
olds . In any event, the central feature of this second phase of the
development of affect theory is the view of affects as "safety valves"
when discharge through action is impossible or forbidden.
The third phase of the affect theory was prefigured on Freud's The
Ego and the Id and achieves its fullest expression in his The Problem
of Anxiety . The key feature here is that, in the adult psyche at least,
the affect-charge is taken over, or "bound," by the ego, and is employed
by it as a "signal" of either internal ( intra-psychic) or external
(reality) danger.
The ego, which before the affect was "tamed" into a
signal endured it passively, now produces it actively.
(Rapaport, 1953, p. 187)
In the purest version of this phase of the theory, affects no longer
serve a discharge function at all; on the contrary, they become "tension-
phenomena" (and in this respect the third phase of the theory resembles
the first). Most important for our present purposes, in this third
phase of the theory affects persist in the psyche as part of the store
of energy accumulated by the ego , and they are activated in a quite
deliberate fashion by the ego as signals, in the service of intra-psychic
12
regulation, reality-testing, and adaption to reality (i.e., social
relationships)
.
Rapaport concludes his presentation with the proposal of an inte-
gration of the second and third phases of the affect theory within an
ego-psychological framework. In this integration, affects in the adult
psyche seem to retain their character as discharge-phenomena, but they
are largely under the control of the ego, at least insofar as it is a
"strong" ego.
As presented by Rapaport, the psychoanalytic theory of affects, at
least in its later phases, accepts the existence of emotions of a wide
range of duration, from "momentary affect storms" to "continuous" states
of such emotions as anxiety or depression, which could presumably last
for months. Affects can even be "frozen" into life-long character
traits. However, the theory does not provide the means to delineate
specific instances or episodes of emotion. A number of ambiguities may
be noted in the psychoanalytic theory, some of which are familiar to us
already from other theoretical perspectives: Is emotion an ever-present,
fluctuating background, a source of specific behaviors and responses,
and/or a time-limited episodic context? Do emotions exist in the form
of a limited number of discrete, mutually-exclusive states, or are they
blended "feeling-states" which can be described on some number of
dimensions? Most pertinently, when an emotion is activated, how long
does it last? Or rather, what meaning can be given to the statement
that it is yet enduring, or has terminated?
A certain amount of this ambiguity stems from the variety of ele-
ments contained in an affect, according to analytic theory: the energy
13
that it discharges is in one sense necessarily life-long (i.e., libido)
but in another sense more time-limited, though still of considerable
duration (cathexis of a particular idea). Rapaport throws into particu-
larly vivid relief an issue which is quite close to our present concerns:
what is the status of a given instance of emotion if it is not currently
being felt or is not active in a direct sense? According to Rapaport,
Freud (at least during the second, "dynamic," phase of the theory)
would deny that it has any status at all, beyond that of sheer potential.
Thus, the duration of a particular episode would be demarcated by the
beginning and end of an unbroken active period. Rapaport himself, on
the other hand, in his insistence on a determinate affect-charge and
the existence of discharge-thresholds, has created an ambiguous status
for an emotion, in which it has a concrete existence (and, presumably,
certain effects) but is not directly active, not "discharging."
We will re-encounter this issue shortly, during our consideration
of emotion-as-subjective-experience and of the state-trait distinction,
and we will attempt to resolve it in the next section of the present
chapter.
Two-factor theory . The general features of Schachter's two-factor, or
cognition-plus-arousal theory are well-known. In brief, Schachter
accounts for emotions with the assertion that
given a state of physiological arousal for which an
individual has no immediate explanation, he will "label"
this state and describe his feelings in terms of the
cognitions available to him. (Schachter, 1964, p. 53)
Emotion is the "explanation" of physiological (in practice, sympathetic)
arousal on the basis of "available congi tions"-- Schachter emphasizes
14
social or "contextual" cues.
The implications of this theory regarding the duration of emotions
depends on whether one focuses on the arousal component or the cognition
component. If the former, the reasoning provided above in discussing
physiological theories is applicable: the duration of emotions is
determined by the functioning of the autonomic nervous system, though
the implications of this are not unambiguous. If the focus is on the
latter, cognitive, component, the implications for duration are altogethe
open, for the category of "cognition" is left so unelaborated by Schachte
that it would seem to impose no constraints whatever on the duration of
emotion.
Overlapping, and perhaps determining, whether the focus in this
realm is on arousal or congition is the issue of whether one's concern
is with emotional experience or emotional behavior (Zillman, 1978).
Schachter would almost certainly hold that emotional experience is con-
tingent on arousal; once arousal fades, there can be no emotional experi-
ence. For emotional behavior, however—particularly if this is under-
stood to include instrumental actions and social interactions as well
as the more frequently emphasized expressive reactions--!' t may be that
"cognition" alone is sufficient for the presence of emotion.
Little can be said in the absence of a fuller account of "cognition"
as it relates to emotion. The present study will elaborate at some
length on the form and content of the impact of cognition on the dura-
tion of anger.
Subjectivist definitions of emotion. Virtually all theories of emotion
15
incorporate subjective experience as a more-or-less integral element;
among the few exceptions might be radical behaviorism and Wenger's
physiological theory. However, not all—relatively few, in fact—define
and conceptualize emotions primarily on the basis of this subjective
component. We have just observed how Schachter's two-factor theory
would seem (somewhat ambiguously) to incorporate both experience and
behavior into its basic concept of emotion. Similarly, psychoanalytic
theory, with its emphasis on the unconscious and its notion of an
"affect-charge" residing somewhere in the psychic apparatus, ranges out-
side the realm of subjective experience in constructing its definition
of emotion. Nonetheless, there are treatments of emotion in which the
definition of emotion is strictly subjective or mental; one such treat-
ment is Richardson's (1918) extensive study of anger.
Working within the introspectionist ethos, Richardson employed
structured diary and interview techniques in his study of various- aspects
of anger, addressing the "mental situation stimulating anger," the "behav-
ior of consciousness" during anger, the "conscious after-effects," and
so on. In the context of such a relatively straightforward approach,
one might anticipate that the question of how longer anger typically
lasts would receive a simple and direct answer; unfortunately, it does
not. Part of the difficulty is that Richardson's reporting, while rich
in observations, does not include a great many quantitative details, and
he does not divulge the typical duration of the incidents of anger
reported by his subjects. In general, he seems to suggest that for the
most part incidents lasted for a matter of minutes; in one of the few
mentions of a specific time period, the discussion of a case lasting
16
"over three quarters of an hour" implies that this was an unusually long
duration among his sample of incidents (p. 35). However, more remains
to be said regarding the duration of incidents of anger in Richardson's
study, and here again we encounter an ambiguity which has appeared in
some form in almost every perspective we have reviewed. At various
points Richardson speaks of "re-appearances" of the "anger emotion"
arising from the same "mental situation" (i.e., cause or instigation);
this is especially common, he observers, when the angry person has failed
to devise a satisfying expression. Though Richardson generally regards
each "appearance" of anger as a discrete incident, one might—either as
investigator or as angry subject—consider all appearances of an "anger
emotion" deriving from the same instigation as constituting a single
incident. In one case, Richardson himself does so; "The emotion may last
for several days, appearing at intervals" (p. 58, emphasis added). In
Rapaport's psychoanalytic theory of affect we discerned the existence of
emotions which are present but not active; in Richardson we find a
description of the same phenomenon, though in this case— in a subjectivist
framework— it amounts to a virtual contradiction.
We need some means of making sense of this phenomenon, and we are
not likely to be satisfied with the psychoanalytic concepts of "affect-
charge" and "discharge-threshold," as these rely on an acceptance of the
most arcane and controversial features of Freudian metapsychology . In-
stead, we will turn now to a concept which has established itself in
the psychological study of emotions and which addresses the temporal
dimension of emotions and particularly their periodic re-appearance, and
we will assess whether it answers our present purposes.
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The state/trait distinction . Spiel berger (1966), like Cattell (cf.,
1966), distinguishes in the area of anxiety between "anxiety as a transi-
tory state and as a relatively stable personality trait" (p. 16). A
state of anxiety, Spielberger continues, consists of conscious feelings
of tension accompanied by autonomic arousal, while
(a)nxiety as a personality trait (A-trait) would seem to
imply a motive or acquired behavioral disposition that pre-
disposes an individual to perceive a wide range of objec-
tively nondangerous circumstances as threatening, and to
respond to these with A-state reactions (1966, p. 17)
Spiel berger 's concept of anxiety as a state adds little to our consider-
ations; we have already encountered this notion of emotions as discrete
periods of conscious experience and/or physiological arousal. His
concept of anxiety as a trait, however, provides something new. It
deals with the periodic appearance of emotional phenomena ("A-states")
and, moreover, it is a psychological property which varies (across
persons). Can this concept resolve the anomaly of emotions which are
present but not active?
Not entirely. A trait is something which, by definition, endures
for the greater part of a person's life, or at least for a number of
years; we must devise a concept applicable to phenomena distributed over
hours or days, not years. In addition, we must deal with appearances
of emotion which all derive from a single "mental situation," in
Richardson's phrase, whereas traits, as Spielberger specifies, refer
to responses to "a wide range of . . . circumstances" (p. 17). What is
needed, apparently, is a concept which shares some of the features of
both the concept of a trait and the concept of a state. In the next
section we will articulate such a concept, and we will find that the
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application of this familiar concept allows us to clear up much of the
logical confusion that has surrounded the temporal dimension of episodes
of emotion.
The Logic and Application of the Concept of a Disposition
In our review of theories of emotion we observed that each encoun-
tered certain difficulties in providing a coherent account of the temporal
dimension of emotions. While these difficulties varied in their particu-
lars from theory to theory, there seems to be one critical source of
confusion that is shared to some extent by all the theories. Each theory
founders when it attempts to extend inherently momentary, dynamic,
"occurrent" concepts to cover features of emotions which are clearly
extended in time. This is perhaps clearest in the case of the facial
feedback theories; the emphasis these theories place on brief and labile
facial expressions leads inevitably to confusion regarding the greater
part of the time course of emotions. A careful reading of Rapaport's
presentation of the psychoanalytic theory of affect reveals this error
and the resulting contradiction with even greater precision. In the
middle phase of the development of that theory, it will be recalled,
the inherently time-limited concept of dynamic "discharge" was made the
basis of emotion. Rapaport's objection to this position was that it
was incapable of accounting for emotions of any substantial duration.
In other words, Rapaport is objecting that a momentary or "occurrent"
concept (the term "occurrent" will be explained shortly) is incompatible
with the extended nature of at least some emotions. Rapaport's proposed
solution— the postulation of discharge-thresholds and a psychic store
19
of affect-charge— is likely to strike all but confirmed adherents of
Freudian metapsychology as specious and inadequate. The remaining
theories, too, suffer from confusions based on the mis-application of
momentary concepts to enduring phenomena. In the physiological vein,
Wenger vascillates in his definition of emotion, defining it at times
as distinct patterns of activity (an enduring concept), at other times
as changes in activity (a momentary concept). Schachter's two-factor
theory, if rigorously pursued, would inevitably encounter not only the
same confusion that afflicts Wenger but additional difficulty stemming
from the ambiguous notion of "cognition" that Schachter invokes.
Finally, even the modest approach of sheer subjectivism runs afoul of
the contradiction between momentary and enduring conceptualizations,
as we discovered in Richardson.
We are faced here with what the recent Anglo-American analytic
philosophers are fond of calling a "conceptual confusion"--the joint
application of subtly incompatible concepts, leading to untenable and
incoherent claims. In such cases it is often possible to undo the
confusion with the judicious application of some simple logic. The
task in the present section is to demonstrate that emotions fall into
the logical category of dispositions, and to show that by recognizing
this fact we may overcome the conceptual confusion which has stood in
the way of a proper understanding of the temporal dimension of emotions.
But first, it is necessary to explicate the general logic of a
disposition.
Dispositions may be physical properties of objects as well as
psychological properties of people. As a rule, they do not refer to
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any single behavior of the object or person, nor do they refer, exactly,
to a set of behaviors. Rather, they refer to the fact that an object
or person will behave in a certain way under some certain set of circum-
stances. Formally, dispositions are expressible in one of a number of
conditional sentences--"If x then y_," where x is a set of circumstances
and y_ is some behavior. Gilbert Ryle, in The Concept of Mind (1949)
provides as an example of a disposition the brittleness of a drinking
glass; one of the conditional relations subsumed by this disposition is
that, if one strikes the glass with a hammer it will break into pieces
(rather than bend or bounce away). Thus, brittleness is a dispositional
quality of the glass which does not necessarily refer to any single
attribute of the glass, and certainly not to any ever-present behavior
of the glass, but instead refers to a more-or-less broad set of regulari-
ties in its behavior under specifiable circumstances.
Psychological dispositions exhibit much the same logic as physical
ones, though the specification of circumstances and behaviors is apt
to be much less precise. The most familiar psychological dispositions
are personality traits . To characterize someone with a trait is not to
claim that he or she is always engaging in the corresponding set of
behaviors but rather (in general) that he or she often engages in these
behaviors and, moreover, may be expected to engage in them under speci-
fiable circumstances. To call someone compassionate, for example, is
to claim that, when confronted by suffering, he or she may be expected
to express sympathy and offer assistance. There is considerable lati-
tude in such attributions. If our compassionate person is confronted
with suffering while under very heavy demands of some other sort, he
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or she may fail to offer sympathy or help without thereby invalidating
the attribution of the trait of compassion. However, there are limits
to this latitude, and if this person fails repeatedly to offer sympathy
under favorable circumstances, we will be inclined to reconsider the
attribution of compassion.
Moods are another familiar variety of psychological disposition.
Clearly, a mood does not refer to any single, constant behavior, but
rather to a set of regularities of response. Perhaps the most straight-
forward dispositional concept in psychology is the conditioned reflex.
To say that an organism has been conditioned does not mean that the
organism is ceaselessly making the conditioned response, only that it
will make the response when presented with the conditioned stimulus.
The conditioned reflex may provide a convenient means by which to
clarify the term "occurrent. " An occurrence, of course, is any concrete
event which takes place at a concrete point in time; at a given moment
the event is either occurring or it isn't. A disposition (physical or
psychological) is made up of occurrences (in a sense) but the disposition
is at a higher level of abstraction. In the case of a conditioned
reflex, the response is an occurrence (and the concept of a conditioned
response is an "occurrent" concept). The reflex— i.e., the regular
relationship between stimulus and response—is a disposition which is
manifested in the occurrence of responses in the presence of the stimulus.
Endless confusion would result if the distinction between these occurrent
and dispositional concepts were blurred; fortunately, no one is likely
to observe the organism at rest and ask, "Where's the reflex?" In the
much more complex realm of emotions, on the other hand, the distinction
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between occurrent and dispositional concepts is not so easily preserved.
Before going on to consider the status of emotions as dispositions,
we need to discuss an important feature of emotions, one which is
established in greater detail elsewhere (Averill, 1979b, in preparation,
Ch. 1). As is evident in our review of psychological theories of emotion,
psychologists have long disputed which category of response is funda-
mental and definitive for emotion. Many types of responses—expressive
(facial, vocal, postural), physiological, muscular (specifically, volun-
tary), cognitive (phenomenological/experiential
,
judgmental/evaluative,
social), etc.— have had their supporters, and extensive research and
theoretical dispute have not yielded notable progress toward consensus.
Careful observation suggests that this impasse is the result of a widely
overlooked feature of emotions. Neither emotions as a class nor specific
emotions depend on any one response or any one type of response. Rather,
emotions consist of co-occurring responses forming a pattern, no single
element of which is absolutely necessary in any given instance. Averill
has applied the term "syndrome" to describe this feature of emotions; a
syndrome is a set of elements in which no single element is essential or
definitive but which, taken together, have an identifiable character.
We may now return to the explication of emotions as dispositions.
To be in an emotional "state" is to be disposed to make some or all of
the responses which comprise the emotional syndrome. The proper attribu-
tion of an emotion does not require the active occurrence of any particu-
lar response; rather, it is an attribution of a disposition to make a
variety of responses. Thus, the absence of any given response at a
particular moment does not invalidate a claim for the presence of an
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emotion for two reasons: first, by virtue of the variability of the
syndromes no single element is essential, and second, the presence of
a disposition does not require, at all times, the presence of the
occurrent responses which manifest the disposition.
The duration of an emotional "state" over a period of time is the
persistence of a disposition over that period of time. In some episodes
of emotion (generally briefer ones) the disposition is co-terminous
with a particular response or with a series of temporally-overlapping
emotional responses; in such cases the emotional activity is uninter-
rupted over the entire course of the episode's duration, and occurrent
concepts such as are subsumed under the concept of a "state" seem to be
applicable. Once it is recognized, however, that these "states" are in
fact dispositions, there is no difficulty in bringing these uninterrupted
episodes and the (usually longer-lasting) episodes in which responses
"re-appear" intermittently, together in a single conceptual framework.
In the former, continuous, episodes there is at least one relevant
response present at all times during the episode. The latter, inter-
mittent, episodes are merely ones in which there happen to be periods
4
during which no_ relevant response is present.
In closing the present section on the logic and application of the
concept of a disposition, it is important to note that we have been
engaged only in a preparatory conceptual ground-clearing, an effort
which addresses substantive questions only in what might be called a
"negative" way. That is, such a conceptual house-cleaning may be
invaluable in helping us to separate false questions from true ones,
but it cannot, in itself, provide answers to the latter. The task of
providing a theoretical and empirical account of the temporal aspects
of anger remains before us.
The Logic and Application of the Concept of an Episode
With the concept of a disposition we have established the basis for
a more logically coherent account of long-term (and short-term) incidents
of emotion. But it is only a basis. For, having resolved one difficulty,
another presents itself. We were compelled to apply the concept of a
disposition to emotion when we found that the customary concept of an
emotional state was too narrow to provide an adequate account; however,
the concept of a disposition, as we have seen, is far too broad to serve
as a theoretical description of incidents of emotion, subsuming, as it
does, not only a wide range of psychological concepts but a great many
non-psychological concepts as well. Under the concept of a state our
conceptual field was too restricted, and could not accommodate certain
important features of the phenomenon at hand; under the concept of a
disposition our conceptual field has become too general and vague. We
need some concept which is more specifically applicable to incidents of
emotion, one which can inform and organize empirical study and theoreti-
cal comprehension.
Fortunately, there is no need to develop an altogether new concept
for these purposes, nor need we resort to borrowing a technical concept
from somewhere in psychology or elsewhere in the social or natural
sciences. For we are only encountering in a theoretical context a prob-
lem that everyone needs to deal with as an elementary aspect of every-
day life. It is not only theoreticians of emotion who are faced with
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the necessity for a workable means of demarcating and comprehending a
given incident of anger or other emotions; in everyday affairs we
require a shared conceptual framework for assigning a given emotional
sensation, action or expression--our own or others '--to a particular
incident, and for determining and communicating when a particular inci-
dent has begun, when it is in progress, and when it has come to an end.
In the present context we need do no more than appropriate the ordinary
conceptual means of accomplishing these tasks, adapting and systematiz-
5
ing it for our purposes.
Recently in social psychology, Harre has advanced a formulation
of the concept of an episode (Harre, 1972; Harre and Secord, 1973) which
meets our specifications, in a rough form at least. Harre elucidates
the everyday concept of an episode, using it as a technical concept at
the same time as it is the object of study. According to Harr§, episodic
concepts impose order on social interactions in the form of, among
other things, a shared comprehension of beginnings, middles, and ends,
as well as a shared interpretive framework for understanding the sig-
nificance of actions. The structure of the episode concept is clearest
in the case of "formal" episodes, such as marriage ceremonies, in which
the relevant norms are explicitly codified and fairly easily articulated
by the participants. For Harre*, most or all social interactions are
based on similar normative structures, and the task of social psych-
ology is to elucidate these.
While it may or may not be possible to subsume episodes of emotion
within Harre" s concept of an episode, there are important and useful
parallels. Episodes of emotion, too, are organized and coherent social
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interactions based on a shared conceptual framework, or normative
structure. For Harre", the study of episodes consists of the explica-
tion of the shared normative structure (which is primarily composed of
"roles" and "rules"). Similarly, our task at present is the explica-
tion of the normative logic which structures episodes of emotion.
For simplicity's sake the present effort will be confined specifi-
cally to anger. Normative structures vary widely from one emotion to
another; they differ in the importance they confer on various features
(i.e., cognitive, behavioral, expressive, physiological, etc.), the
consistency of norms for duration, the involvement of norms of justice
and reciprocal obligation, the clarity and importance of temporal
boundaries, and so on. For the moment, moreover, we will restrict our-
selves to elucidating the everyday logic of the demarcation of anger
episodes in time, the means of delineating what belongs to an anger
episode and what does not. This logic forms the basis of the temporal
structure of the episode.
Probably the foremost criterion for demarcating an episode of anger
is the requirement that all elements of the anger, regardless of their
separation in time, must refer in some fairly direct way to a single
instigating offense or event. It is always fair to ask an angry person
what he or she is angry about; if we ask twice at different times and
receive two unrelated answers we will conclude that we are observing
two distinct episodes (unless we believe one of the answers was a
dissimulation). This points up the possibility of engaging in a dispute
about the instigation of an angry response, which would by the same
token be a dispute about what episode an angry response belongs to.
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Suppose someone becomes angry at us for a trifling offense the day after
we angered them with a more serious one. We might say, "You're not
angry about this, you're still angry about what happened yesterday."
Even if the angry person denied this, the matter need not end there,
for we might respond, "Nonsense, you've never gotten angry about this
before, you must still be angry about yesterday." In such a dispute,
both parties would be applying their shared comprehension of the social
schema for anger, and especially those aspects concerning duration and
termination.
Here the distinction between an object and a cause of an emotion,
a distinction which goes back to David Hume, becomes relevant (cf.,
Averill, 1979b). The object of an emotion— the "instigation," in this
context— is what the emotion is "about." In the case of anger, the
object is usually an action of some person which unjustifiably or unfair-
ly inflicts some kind of harm on the angry person. (Of course, neither
the unfairness nor the harm need be "objectively" present, only subjec-
tively so.) A cause of an emotion is any condition or event without
which the emotion would not have occurred. The relevance of this dis-
tinction to the present discussion is this: a given episode of anger
can have only one instigation, but it can have any number of causes.
Suppose we get angry at someone for cancelling a dinner arrangement
at the last minute. The instigation, of course, is the cancellation,
or rather the thoughtless-cancel lation-at-the-last-minute. However, we
may be angry because: we were looking forward to the dinner, there was
something we needed to discuss, we are embarrassed at being snubbed,
this person has done something similar in the past, etc. And these are
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only the more pertinent causes: some irrelevant but still genuine
causes might be: neither of us were ever in a fatal automobile acci-
dent, our mothers both worked in the same office when we were children,
my phone was in use for a half-hour the night before, and so on, ad
infinitum. Like objects, causes are often involved in disputes about
emotions. We might often say something like, "You're only angry at me
because you had a bad day." However, such an argument does not bear
on the unity of an episode.
A second criterion for demarcating an episode—somewhat looser
than the first—is a requirement that, in the absence of major obstacles,
the anger should be in evidence in all consecutive direct encounters
between angry person and target which occur between the instigating
event and the termination of the anger. To return to the discourteous
cancellation of the dinner arrangement: when we next see this person,
we are likely to express our anger in some way, or at least to angrily
consider the injury that was done us. If not, we are unlikely to
consider ourselves to be still angry about the incident, at least with-
out some special explanation, and the target of our anger would be
somewhat puzzled if, on some subsequent occasion, we expressed our anger.
And it need not be a direct encounter with the target which requires
some angry response in order for subsequent responses to be considered
part of the same episode. A mention of the target's name by a mutual
friend, the performing of some task which will benefit the target, the
arranging of a dinner appointment with some other person, or any other
event which is somehow related to the instigation of the episode may be
(loosely) expected to call forth some kind of angry response; if not,
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we may come to the conclusion, reflectively or pre-reflectively , that
the episode has been terminated.
This second criterion, that of consistent appearance of angry
responses on consecutive appropriate occasions, unlike the first criter-
ion, is not a logical necessity for the unity of an episode. Whether
this criterion is actually invoked by people in evaluating their own
and others' angry responses is an empirical question. The criterion is
included here because it seems quite likely that the strict conceptual
criteria for demarcating an episode of anger are in practice augmented
by norm-governed actions and behaviors. A norm requiring consistent
appearance of angry behaviors would be one such behavioral means of
establishing the unity and internal continuity of an episode of anger.
A third criterion for demarcating an anger episode, and the last
one we will discuss, is that a given episode must have a more-or-less
unitary aim , an objective which would, if obtained, bring the anger
episode to an end. Examples of such aims would be an apology from the
person who is the target of the anger, or an attempt on the part of
that person to set right the damage he or she had done. Just as it is
always fair to ask an angry person what he or she is angry about, we
can also ask what would "satisfy" his or her anger and bring it to an
end. If the angry person can say little or nothing about what would
bring his or her anger to an end, or is exerting no effort toward this
end even when circumstances are favorable—or if we make a presumably
satisfying response without the angry person's anger thereby being
brought to an end--we will wonder whether there is more involved than
a simple description of a coherent single episode of anger would
30
encompass
.
Here it is necessary to make another logical distinction. Just
as we must distinguish between the object and the cause(s) of an episode
of anger, we must distinguish between the aim of the episode, on the
one hand, and the variety of events or conditions which would terminate
the episode, on the other hand. These latter might be termed "termina-
tion conditions." They would include the aim, but would also include
many other events and circumstances, any one of which would suffice to
cause the episode to come to an end. Some examples might be: the
occurrence of some life-changing event for the angry person, a serious
misfortune befalling the target, the emergence of mitigating circum-
stances which excuse the anger-instigating action of the target, the
passage of a long period of time, etc. Any one of these events might
suffice to bring the anger to an end, without their having been any part
of the angry person's aim. Just as a given episode can have any number
of causes but only one object, an episode can have any number of
potential termination conditions but only one aim.
To sum up, then, a single episode of anger is demarcated by a single
instigation, a single aim, and continuity in time or (possibly) consis-
tency of appearance on consecutive relevant occasions.
A Social Constructivist View of Emotion
In the previous section we implied, without offering any specific
argument to this effect, that the conceptual logic of an episode is not
merely an analytic tool, but is also an integral component of everyday
anger and other emotions; that is, that social norms have a crucial
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formative role in emotion. Since this is far from a universally-
accepted position, it is necessary at this point to indicate the source
of this assertion and to provide some relevant details. The assertion
is drawn from the "constructivist" view of emotions, developed in
recent years by Averill (1976, 1979a, 1979b). In this view, emotions
are "constructions" in two distinct senses, and both senses contribute
to the present analysis of anger.
In the first sense, the basic nature of emotions is held to be a
social construction. That is, the various elements of a given emotion-
emotional syndrome
,
actually—are formed into a coherent whole by
socially-based schemata. These schemata subsume the emotion's instiga-
tion, formal object, characteristic responses and actions, and to some
extent—as will be argued below--its duration and requirements for
termination. Moreover, the fundamental status of emotions as involuntary
"passions," as opposed to actions with which the agent is identified,
is considered from the constructivist viewpoint to be the product of a
social process and not a consequence of biology. Each emotional schema,
as well as the overall category of emotion, is integrated in multiple
and complex ways into the general structure of social relations.
In the second sense, emotions are constructions in that each episode
of an emotion is constructed by the individual --or, better, individual s—
involved, on the basis of his or her (their) comprehension of the
socially-based schema. This active construction is carried on through
both pre-reflecti ve and reflective monitoring and experience (cf .
,
Harre and Secord, 1973). Pre-reflecti vely, the emotional person employs
the social schema in forming an appraisal of the instigating situation,
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interpreting physiological responses such as arousal, muscular tension,
and possibly facial expression, and producing communicative and instru-
mental actions. At a more reflective level the appropriateness or
justification for the emotion is assessed, its significant implications
in the situation or relationship are asserted or negotiated, and some
general or specific resolution is arrived at.
Later in the present study these features of emotions-as-constructions
will be applied in discussing various psychological and social -normative
influences on the duration and termination of episodes of anger, and
in describing the means by which the participants incorporate these
influences in their construction of the episode.
Outline of the Present Study
The remainder of the present report is devoted to the presentation
and discussion of empirical data bearing on the issues reviewed above.
A questionnaire was devised and administered in order to gather informa-
tion on temporally-related aspects of anger episodes. In the present
section the questionnaire will be described and the discussion to be
based on it will be roughly outlined. In the following chapter the
questionnaire and procedures will be described in greater detail.
The questionnaire was adapted from one which has been applied
previously in the study of everyday anger (Averill, 1979a; in prepara-
tion), adhering to its general outline but differing from it in a variety
of particulars. The single most pertinent difference lies in the word-
ing of the question regarding the duration of the subjects' anger. In
the original questionnaire subjects were asked how long their anger
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lasted "when it first occurred;" in the present questionnaire, on the
basis of the concept of an episode presented above, subjects were asked
to indicate the time period from the point when they first became angry
about the particular incident to the point when they "stopped feeling
angry about it." In order to insure that subjects described complete
episodes, the instructions emphasized that they should choose an episode
which was over at the time they filled out the questionnaire.
An attempt was made to include in the questionnaire as many factors
as possible that might have a relationship to the duration of anger
episodes. A small number of subject variables were assessed, primarily
the subjects' age and year in school (the questionnaire was administered
to university undergraduates). A second group of factors are what might
be called background factors to the episode. These include features of
the relationship between the subject and the target of his or her anger
(authority relations, the degree of intimacy, the length of time the
relationship had existed at the time of the episode, the likelihood that
it would continue to exist six months hence, and the frequency of contact
between the two persons), the background of the instigating offense
(essentially whether it was a standing issue of contention between the
two persons), and, finally, transitory features of the situation at the
time of the instigation which might have inhibited the direct expression
of anger by the subject. The remainder of the questionnaire addressed
aspects internal to the episode itself. These include the nature of
the instigation, various actions and responses of the subject, and a
variety of events which commonly transpire during an episode of anger
and which, it was thought, might play a role in its termination. Other
34
aspects of the episode addressed by the questionnaire include, in
addition to its duration: its intensity, the time elapsed between the
episode and the subjects' filling out the questionnaire, and the number
of discrete periods of angry responses which comprised the episode.
Finally, subjects were asked to render two retrospective judgments about
the episode; they were asked to judge how harmful or beneficial the
episode had been, on the whole, and they were asked whether, at the
time they filled out the questionnaire, they considered the incident
which led to the episode to be "fully resolved."
It is evident that these different aspects of the episode and its
context stand in a variety of relations to duration. Some would seem
to be directly related to duration, while others are likely limited to
an indirect relation. Some might play a preparatory or causal role in
relation to duration, others would more likely be causal consequences
of duration, and the causal status of still others is undecidable.
These are logical ambiguities inherent in the actual phenomenon. To
these inevitable ambiguities are added those introduced by a retrospective,
self-report method. Relationships which might be in fact relatively
straightforward are difficult to interpret owing to the possibility of
one or another "report bias," and even logical temporal priority among
the elements of the episode cannot serve as a reliable guide, since the
reports are retrospective.
Operating within the constraints imposed by a correlational, retro-
spective, self-report method applied to a co-related set of factors,
the relationships observed among the variables of the questionnaire will
be reported, and applied toward a descriptive characterization of anger
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inferior, or equal authority relation to the subject. Subjects also
indicated how long they had known the target at the time of the inci-
dent, estimated the likelihood that the two of them would still be in
regular contact six months after completing the questionnaire, indicated
how frequently they were in contact at the time the questionnaire was
completed, and rated the closeness or intimacy of their relationship on
a 10-point scale.
Instigations . A set of descriptions of instigations to anger was devised
specifically for the present questionnaire. An attempt was made to make
the items (1) exhaustive, (2) comparable in their generality, and (3)
each reflect a distinct functional requisite or need residing in the
situation. Subjects were asked to indicate which one of these items
was most important in making them angry. If none of the seven items
properly described what was most important in making them angry, subjects
had the option of specifying the most important instigation in their own
words. In addition to specifying the most important instigation, sub-
jects rated all the items on a three-point scale (0="not at all," 1=
"somewhat," 2= "very much") according to the degree to which it was
involved in what angered them. If they described an instigation in
their own words (whether or not it was the most important instigation)
they rated this instigation, too, on the same three-point scale.
In a separate item, all subjects described what made them angry in
their own words.
Responses . A list of common responses while angry was adopted, with some
modification, from the earlier questionnaire. One response category in
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episodes of short and long duration. In this way certain theoretical
points may be substantiated, and the conceptual framework which has
been offered for anger episodes will be fleshed out with a certain
amount of concrete detail.
A particular focus for discussion will be the factors responsible
for the termination of episodes, since, in a given episode, the factors
responsible for its termination constitute the "effective" cause of its
duration. Data gathered through the questionnaire will be brought to
bear in an attempt to clarify the complex of factors which contribute
to the termination of anger episodes.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 235 students enrolled in psychology courses at the
University of Massachusetts, ranging in age from 18 to 48 (mean age=
20.6). Seventy-five subjects were men; 160 were women.
Procedure
Subjects were recruited in psychology classes—primarily intro-
ductory ones—at the University of Massachusetts, and through advertis-
ing placed in a central location in the Psychology building at the
University. Potential subjects were invited to take with them a
schedule sheet which described the study as a questionnaire concerning
various aspects of an everyday emotion and listed the times and places
the questionnaire would be available.
Upon arriving at the session, subjects were welcomed by the
experimenter, who explained that the study concerned a recent instance
of anger and invited questions at any time. Subjects were then given
an informed consent form and the questionnaire. As each subject
completed the questionnaire he or she was given a written feedback form
which briefly explained the context and purposes of the study, and an
"experimental credit" form which could be applied toward the course
grade in psychology courses.
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Materials
A questionnaire was devised to address various aspects of a single
recent incident of anger, in self-report fashion. In form and content
the questionnaire parallels one previously devised and employed by
Averill (1979b, in preparation). The questionnaire devised for the
present study is included here as Appendix A.
Subject instructions . On a cover page to the questionnaire subjects
were instructed to recall the most intense incident of anger at someone
they know personally occurring within the previous week. If there had
been no such incident within the previous week they were asked to choose
the most recent incident, no matter how mild. They were told to be sure
that the feeling was genuinely one of anger and not a related feeling,
and that the anger over this particular instigation must be over. They
were then asked to take a moment to recall the details of the incident
before proceeding to the questions.
Subject information . Subjects were asked for their age, year in school,
living situation (dorm, apartment, or house), whether they lived with
their family, and their sex. This information was solicited on the last
page of the questionnaire.
Target information . Subjects provided certain information regarding the
target of his or her anger and that person's relationship to the subject.
They described the relation in which the target stood to them (friend,
roommate, boyfriend or girlfriend, mother, father, etc.), specified the
target's sex, and indicated whether he or she stood in a superior,
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the earlier questionnaire— "Verbal or symbolic aggression"—was broken
down into three more specific categories for the present questionnaire.
Three items were created to assess responses presumably specific to
relatively long-term episodes of anger. Seven of the most common
responses in the Averill questionnaire were incorporated directly into
the present questionnaire, for a total of 13 response items. Subjects
rated each response on a three-point scale (0="not at all," l="somewhat,
"
and 2="very much") according to the degree to which they did it at any
time during their anger.
Crying . As a follow-up to observations made in previous studies (Averill,
in preparation, Ch. 13), subjects who wept at any time during their
anger answered a series of questions regarding the situation in which
they cried, the meaning of their weeping, and the target's response to it.
These data are not relevant to the main objectives of the present study,
and hence will not be reported here.
Events during the episode . A list of ten "events" thought likely to occur
during episodes of anger and of interest in the present context was
constructed for the present questionnaire (see Appendix A, items 50-59).
These events included changes in the thoughts and feelings of the sub-
ject (increased determination to change the instigating situation, feel-
ing less affection for the target, and attributing the instigating action
to the target's problems or shortcomings), actions or changes on the
part of the target (attempting to undo the damage he or she had done,
offering assurances that the offending action would not be repeated,
learning more about the subject's needs and desires, and becoming angry
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at the subject), and responses of one or more third parties (agreeing
with the subject that he or she was right to be angry, offering to help
the subject improve the situation, and thinking more highly of the
subject). This list of events was compiled on the basis of two sections
in the Averill questionnaire: a "motives" section, in which subjects
indicated retrospectively what they thought they had been trying to
accomplish with their anger, and a "responses" section, similar in
content to the responses section of the present questionnaire. The items
in these two sections which were endorsed by substantial numbers of
subjects in two previous studies (Averill, in preparation, Chs. 8-10)
were used as indicators of common events in episodes of anger.
Most of the ten events are ones which might be considered favorable
or beneficial. This reflects previous findings that anger is more often
considered beneficial than harmful (Averill, in preparation) and, in
addition, is the result of an interest on the part of the present investi-
gator in identifying benefits, or functions , of anger.
Subjects rated the occurrence of the ten events at any point during
their anger on the same three-point scale used for instigations and
responses
.
Termination factors . As a way of assessing the occurrences responsible
for the termination of anger, a list of twelve termination factors was
constructed by adding two items of theoretical interest (items 61 and
62) to the ten-item "events" list. Subjects chose one of the twelve as
the most important factor in terminating their anger, then rated the
contribution of each of the twelve on the three-point scale. If a subject
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found that an important factor, or the_ most important factor, was not
among the twelve offered, he or she had the option of specifying one in
his or her own words, and rating its contribution on a two-point scale.
In a separate item, all subjects described, in their own words,
what brought their anger to an end.
First-hour events . Subjects whose anger lasted one hour or longer were
instructed to think back to a point one hour after they first became angry
and answer a set of questions concerning the events of this initial
period. (Subjects whose anger lasted approximately one hour were
instructed to consider the initial half-hour.) The initial set of ten
events was repeated on the questionnaire once again, and subjects rated
the degree to which each one occurred in the first period of their anger
on the three-point scale. They then described in their own words the
events during this period.
Subjects were then asked to choose from a set of five [including
"Other (please specify)"] one or more reasons that their anger had not
yet come to an end at the close of the initial period; all subjects were
then asked to elaborate in their own words why their anger had not yet
terminated.
Duration . Subjects were asked how long their anger lasted, from the time
they first felt angry about the particular incident, or "realized" they
felt angry about it, to the time they "stopped feeling angry about it."
This wording was intended to insure that subjects reported the duration
of the entire episode. The response options were drawn from a similar
question in the Averill questionnaire; they were adapted for the present
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purposes by more finely differentiating the upper end.
Subjects were also asked how many days previous to answering the
questionnaire the incident occurred.
Intensity
.
Subjects rated the intensity of their anger on a single 10-
point scale.
History of the instigating action . Subjects were asked whether the tar-
get of their anger had ever committed the instigating action previously
(item #19). If so, they were asked how often he or she had done so with-
in the previous month, how many times they (the subjects) had been angry
about this action, and how many times they had complained about it to
the offender.
Periods of angry feelings . Subjects were asked to indicate how many
discrete periods of angry thoughts, feelings and/or interactions were
included in their episode of anger (item #26). Response options ranged
from "one" to "six or more."
Expression of anger to its target . Subjects were asked whether they
expressed their anger to the person they were angry at immediately on
becoming angry (item #27). If not, they explained why not by choosing
one from among a list of six possible reasons, or provided the reason in
their own words. Then, all subjects were asked to elaborate in their
own words as to why they did not express their anger immediately to its
target (if they did not).
All subjects were asked whether they expressed their anger to its
target at any_ point during its course (item #30).
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Resolution of incident
. Even though subjects were not angry about the
incident they described by the time they filled out the questionnaire,
they were asked whether they felt the incident was "fully resolved"
(item #17). If not, they explained why in their own words.
Benefits
.
Subjects rated on a seven-point scale the degree to which
their anger was "adaptive vs. maladaptive" (item #49). Later in the
questionnaire (item #75) they described in their own words any benefits
produced by the episode.
Adjustment of the Data Base
Exclusions from the sample
. Twenty-eight completed questionnaires had
to be excluded from the sample (11 men, 15 women, 2 uncertain). The
most common reason for exclusion was that too much time had elapsed
between the incident and the completion of the questionnaire; in order
to be consistent with the Averill data and to insure accurate reporting
only subjects reporting an incident no more than one month prior to
completing the questionnaire were included, and eleven subjects
exceeded this limit. Other reasons for exclusion were: missing or
reversed pages in the questionnaire, missing information about instiga-
tion, termination or duration, missing subject information, a series of
provocations rather than a single incident, a fabricated incident, and
the fact that the subject's anger was not over.
Adjustments to subjects' responses . As described below, where clearly
indicated, subjects' responses were altered to make the data base more
consistent or to improve interpretabili ty.
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In the ratings on the three-point scale of the instigations,
responses, events, termination factors, and first-hour events, subjects
occasionally wrote "not applicable" or "NA," or simply left ratings
blank. Since the ratings were intended to reflect simply involvement
or occurrence of the item, regardless of whether the item was relevant
or "applicable" to the particular incident, such responses were not
treated as missing but instead were treated as a rating of zero.
Though subjects were instructed to rate the involvement of all
instigations and termination factors, some omitted the rating of the one
they selected as most important. In all presentations of the data and
in the analyses, such instances are treated as ratings of two ("very
much")
.
There were two typographical errors in response options. In the
"Other (please specify)" item among the instigations subjects were mis-
takenly offered the option of rating its contribution as zero; some
subjects circled this zero (without describing an instigation), and
these responses were ignored. The second error occurred in the item
which inquired as to how many times the subject had gotten angry at the
target for the action which instigated the present incident. The
response option "more than three times" was typed in twice. Responses
to either were treated equi valently
.
When subjects were asked how many days prior to their filling out
the questionnaire, some made their reply in units other than days.
"One week" was coded as seven days, "1 1/2 weeks" was coded as ten days,
and "one month" was coded as 31 days.
The response of subjects who answered "yes" to the question about
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whether they expressed their anger immediately to its target was changed
to "no" if they answered the subsequent two questions about the reasons
they did not express their anger immediately. Some subjects who indi-
cated they had expressed their anger immediately to the targets did
not answer the question about whether they expressed their anger at any
point during their anger; such missing responses were treated as "yes"
responses. On the same question, some subjects answered "no" but made
open-ended responses and ratings of their behaviors which made it clear
that they had, in fact, expressed their anger to its target; accordingly,
their "no's" were changed to "yes."
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
In the present chapter the relationship between duration and all
items in the questionnaire which were included as being relevant to
duration will be reported, primarily in the form of Pearson correlation
coefficients. Where relevant, these relationships will be presented
together with univariate descriptive statistics— largely means and
rankings of means—drawn from sets of items. In addition, a temporally-
based discriminant analysis of the ten "events" items will be reported.
Duration
Subjects were asked to indicate the duration of their anger, from
the time they first became angry in the episode, or first "realized"
they were angry, to the time they stopped feeling angry (see Appendix
A, item #23). Their responses are displayed in Table 1. Both the mean
and median duration were between one to two hours and a half day. The
modal response was one to two hours, with 36 subjects (15%) rating this
duration, closely followed by one day (35 Ss; 15%) and two to three days
(also 35 Ss). Only ten percent of the subjects reported episodes lasting
ten minutes or less.
Other General Characteristics of the Episode
The means of four items describing general characteristics of the
episode are presented in Table 2, together with the correlations of these
46
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Table 1
Duration of Anger Episodes
Scale
val ue Duration Frequency
% of total sample
(n=235)
1 less than 5 minutes 5 2%
2 5-10 minutes 19 QO/O/o
3 less than 1/2 hour 27 11%
4 less than 1 hour 33 14%
5 1-2 hours 36 15%
6 1/2 day 21 HI 9%
7 1 day 35 15%
8 2-3 days 35 15%
9 4 days-one week 14 6%
10 more than one week 10 4%
Mean scale value=5.59
Median scale value=5.43
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items with duration. The four items are: the intensity of the subject's
anger, the number of discrete periods of angry responses comprising the
episode, whether or not the subject considered the incident to be fully
resolved at the time he or she filled out the questionnaire, 7 and the
degree of benefit the subject felt was associated with the episode as
a whole. Of particular interest are the positive correlations of dura-
tion with intensity (.44, p < . 001 ) and periods (.52, p < .01 )
.
Days Elapsed Since Incident
Subjects were asked to indicate how many days had elapsed between
the anger incident and their filling out the questionnaire. The mean was
6.65, and this item showed a correlation with duration of .34 (p < . 01 )
.
Subjects' Age, Year in School, and Sex
The mean age of subjects was 20.6, and age correlated with duration
at -.18 (p< . 01 ) . Year in school (i.e., Freshman, Sophomore, Junior,
or Senior) likewise correlated negatively with duration (r=-.14, p<.05).
For the most part, the effects of the sex of the subject are not
relevant to the objectives of the present study, and will not be reported
g
here; in any event, these effects are very few in number. One class
of such effects is, however, relevant— the interaction effects of sex
on the relationship of duration and other variables. This topic is
taken up in Appendix B, in which tables breaking down the correlations
with duration by sex are presented. In the present and subsequent
chapters, the reader will be informed where significant sex differences
exist in the results under discussion.
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A sex difference in the correlation between duration and intensity
deserves special mention, both because of the size of the difference
and because of the importance of the relationship between duration and
intensity in the presentation and discussion of the remainder of the
results. The correlation between duration and intensity in the entire
sample is .44; among the men, it is .20 (n=75, p< .10), while among
women it is .54 (n=160, p < . 001 )
.
Background Aspects of the Episode
The items include features of the relationship between the subject
and the target, the history of the instigating offense (i.e., whether
it was the first time the target had committed this offense, and if not,
how many times it had been committed before, how many times it had made
the subject angry, and how many times the subject had registered a com-
plaint about it with the target) and features of the prevailing situation
at the time of the instigation which may have inhibited the subject's
expression of anger. With only one exception, these variables did not
show statistically-significant relationships with duration. The single ex-
ception was the number of times the offense had been committed previously,
the more often the instigating offense had been committed previously by
the target the shorter the subject's anger tended to last, though the
g
relationship was quite weak (r=-.17, p<.05).
Correlations between duration and the dichotomous or continuous
background variables are presented in Table 3.
It has already been noted that duration is fairly highly correlated
with intensity in the present sample (r=.44). In addition to its
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Table 3
Correlations of Background Factors of the Episode With
Duration, and Partial Correlation (Intensity Partialled Out)
Item No. in Correlation
Variable questionnai re N with duration Partial r
Relationship
With Target
Authority 3 235 .03 .03
Intimacy 7 243 .01 -.02
Relationship
Past 4 235 -.08 -.03
Complained
Before
a
Relationship
Future 5 235 -.07" .02
Frequency of
Contact 6 235 -.12 -.13*
History of
Offense
First Time 19 234 .06
b
-.03
Done Before 20 150 -.17* -.18*
Angry Before 21 149 -.01 .01
22 147 .04 .02
*p .05
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p< .05). See
Appendix B.
Wginally significant sex difference (p< .10). See
Appendix B.
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independent significance, this association raises the question of whether
the positive associations observed between duration and other variables
are in fact associations with intensity and not duration. To check for
this possibility, partial correlations were computed between duration
and all other variables, partialling out intensity from both variables
in each correlation. The simple correlations between duration and other
variables are presented together with the corresponding partial correla-
tions with intensity partialled out, in Table 3 and all subsequent tables.
Subjects who did not express their anger immediately to the target
indicated the most important reason for not doing so, choosing from a
list of six features of the situation or describing the reason in their
own words. The list of items they chose from included such items as
"Because the person himself or herself was not present" and "Because,
though the person you were angry at was present, the two of you were not
alone" (see Appendix A, item #28). A one-way analysis of variance per-
formed on these items with duration as the dependent variable produced
a non-significant F-ratio; duration did not differ according to the
reason subjects did not express their anger immediately. (The relation-
ship of duration to whether the subject expressed his or her anger to
the target immediately or at all is reported in a later section on
responses.
)
Instigations
Subjects, it will be recalled, indicated the instigation of their
anger in two ways. First, they selected, from a list of seven possibili-
ties, the single item which best described the incident which angered
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them, or they described the most important element in the instigation
of their anger in their own words. Then they rated the involvement
of all seven items (or all eight, if they included their own descrip-
tion). (See Appendix A, p. 108 for items and instructions.) Thus,
the relationship of duration with instigations can be assessed in two
ways: mean durations can be compared according to the most important
instigation, using analysis of variance, and Pearson correlations can
be computed between duration and the ratings of each instigation.
As is evident in Table 4 (in which the descriptive statistics
regarding instigation are presented for reference) four of the instiga-
tions were endorsed as most important by a negligible number of subjects,
leaving only three items with a substantial number of endorsements.
These three are:
A criticism of you, complaint or an insult. Anything
someone said to you which implied a bad opinion of you or
something you had done. (45 subjects; 19% of total sample)
This item will be referred to as "criticism. 14
Something which got in the way of something you were doing
or planned to do, interfering with some ongoing or planned
activity. (49 subjects; 21% of total sample)
This item will be referred to as "frustration."
An action which was not in keeping with the kind of
relationship you have or would like to have with this
person, or with what you expect from this person.
(92 subjects; 39% of total sample)
This item will be referred to as "violation of relational expectations."
The results of a one-way analysis of variance employing these
instigations as the three levels of the independent factor and duration
as the dependent measure are displayed in Table 5. The lowest mean
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Table 5
Mean Duration Broken Down by Most
Important Instigation (N=186)
Most important
instigation N_ Mean duration
Violation of
relational 92 6.25 (approx. 1/2 day)
expectations
Frustration 49 4.75a (approx. 1 hour)
Criticism 45 5.95 (approx. 1/2 day)
F
2 133
=7,02
'
p < ,005
a
Differs from other two means by Duncan's
multiple range test (p=.05).
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duration is that of episodes instigated by frustration. The mean duration
of episodes instigated by criticism is substantially higher; slightly
higher than this is the mean duration of episodes instigated by violation
of relational expectations.
Correlations were computed between duration and the subjects' rat-
ings of the involvement of each of the seven instigation items. 10 Six
of the correlations were negligible. 11 The only substantial correlation
was that between duration and violation of relational expectations
(r=.29, p < . 001 ) . This correlation was also substantial even among
those subjects who did not choose this instigation as the most important
(r=.27, n=143, p < . 001 ) . Finally, the correlation between duration and
violation of relational expectations is only slightly reduced when
intensity is partialled out of the correlation (partial r=.26, p < . 001 )
-
Responses
Expression of anger directly to target . There v/as no significant
correlation between duration and whether the subject expressed his or
her anger directly to the target. Among those subjects who did express
their anger directly to the target at some point during the episode,
there was a weak relationship between immediate expression and dura-
tion; when subjects expressed their anger to the target immediately at
the time of the instigation, duration tended to be somewhat shorter
(r=.17, n=169, p <.05; partial r with intensity partialled out=.19,
p < .05).
Specific responses . The mean ratings of the 13 response items of the
questionnaire, the correlations of these responses with duration, and
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the corresponding partial correlations with intensity partial led out
are presented in Table 6. In presenting these results it may be helpful
to divide the response items into three categories, based on their
patterns of correlation. The first distinction is between those
responses which do not show a significant simple correlation with dura-
tion and those which do. Among the latter, two categories may be
distinguished: those which do not show a significant partial correlation
with curation, and those which show a significant partial correlation
with duration as well as a significant simple correlation. It must
be borne in mind throughout this discussion that the differences between
these correlations—either across types of correlations (simple vs.
partial) or across items—are not large, and are therefore somewhat
hazardous to interpret. In fact, were it not for the fact that the
fairly large sample size yields relatively stable correlations, this
interpretation would not be attempted.
Responses uncorrected with duration . Only three of the 13
response items failed to show a significant correlation with duration
(i.e.
, p >.05). This is presumably due to the fact that the longer
anger lasts the more opportunity there is to perform a response and to
perform it repeatedly or to a greater "degree" (see Appendix A, p. 113
for instructions to subjects, who were asked to rate the "degree" to
which they performed the various responses at any time during their
anger)
.
One of the response items uncorrected with duration is "Scolding
the offender, accusing him or her of wrongdoing." There are two other
response items which consist of verbal aggression, and each of these
Table 6
Correlations of Duration with Responses While Angry, and Partial Correlations
with Intensity Partialled Out (N=235) - Entire Sample
Responses
Direct expression to target
Scolding the offender, accusing him or her
of wrongdoing.
Thinking about and planning a confrontation;
imagining ways to express your anger or
resolve the incident.
Emphatically pointing to the damage done by
the offender; pointing out the hurt he or
she inflicted on you or the problems he or
she caused you*
Talking the event over with the offender
without exhibiting hostility.
Making nasty remarks, calling the offender
names, generally expressing bad feelings or
ill will toward the offender.
Indirect expression to target or others
Showing your displeasure by withdrawing from
the situation, wanting to be alone, or giving
the target of your anger the "cold shoulder."
Denial or removal of some benefit customarily
enjoyed by the offender.
Crying, coming to tears over the incident.
Avoidant responses
Trying to talk yourself out of feeling angry.
Engaging in calming activities (e.g., going
for a walk, watching t.v., etc.)
Trying not to- think of the incident, avoiding
thoughts of the offender and what he or she
did.
Telling a third party
Talking the incident over with a neutral, un-
involved third party, with no intent to harm
the offender.
Telling a third party in order to get back at
the offender, or to have the offender punished.
Mean
Ratings
1.00
1.00
.96
.76
.60
.89
.67
.37*
.87
.86
.68
.98
.25
.04
.21
.15**
.06
.17**
.20
.25
.24**1
.03
.13**
20
Partial r
n
.n
.08
.05
.06
.15'
.16'
.09*
.03
.14'
.19
*p <
. 1 0 **p < . 05 ***P < . 01
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p < .05)
.36***
.
24***
See Appendix B
33***
1 g***
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shows a modest simple correlation with duration. However, neither of
these latter two show a significant partial correlation with duration.
Another of the items uncorrelated with duration is "Talking the
event over with the offender without exhibiting hostility." This item
is the only item, apart from the three "verbal aggression" items just
mentioned, which involves explicit expression of anger directly to the
offender, suggesting that direct expression does not predominate over
the course of longer-lasting anger.
The final item uncorrelated with duration is "Trying to talk your-
self out of feeling angry." It appears that as the duration of anger
increases one's thoughts are not as much attempts to talk oneself out
of being angry as they are attempts "not to think of the incident"
(r=.20, partial r=.19) or "thinking about and planning confrontation"
(r=.21
,
partial r=.ll )
.
Responses with significant simple correlations only . There are four
items in this category. The fact that these items do not show signifi-
cant partial correlations with duration when intensity is parti ailed
out does not mean, of course, that these responses are not associated
with duration; rather, it means these responses are rated higher as
duration increases only insofar as intensity increases also.
Two of the items in this category have already been mentioned as
falling under the heading "verbal aggression." They are:
Making nasty remarks, calling the offender names,
generally expressing bad feelings or ill will toward
the offender. (r=.17, partial r=.06)
and,
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Emphatically pointing to the damage done by the
offender; pointing out the hurt he or she inflicted
on you or the problems he or she caused you. r= 15
partial r=.03) '
Even the simple correlations with duration are quite modest, and what-
ever association there is between these verbal aggression items and
duration is confounded with their association with intensity. 12
A third item showing this pattern of correlation is:
Thinking about and planning a confrontation; imagining
ways to express your anger or resolve the incident.
(r=.21, partial r=.ll)
One would anticipate that this response would be more predominant in
longer-lasting episodes; to some extent, those long-term episodes in
which it is more predominant are also ones which are rated as more
intense.
.
The final response item showing a significant simple correlation
and a non-significant partial correlation with duration is:
Crying, coming to tears over the incident. (r=.24,
partial r=.09)
Thus, crying seems to be more closely associated with intensity than with
duration. 1 ^
Responses with significant simple and partial correlations . These
six items show an association with duration which is largely or entirely
independent of their association with intensity.
Two of these responses are a kind of non-verbal aggression against
the offender:
Denial or removal of some benefit customarily enjoyed by
the offender. (r=.25, partial r=.16)
Showing your displeasure by withdrawing from the situation,
wanting to be alone, or giving the target of your anger the
"cold shoulder." (r=.20, partial r=.15)
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In both cases the partial correlation is somewhat lower. Thus, longer-
lasting anger tends to include this non-verbal retaliation, and this
tendency is stronger when the anger is also considered more intense.
Two of the responses in this category are directed toward a third
party (and these two are the only responses in the entire list which
are). The first is a retaliatory response, while the second is a more
constructive response:
Telling a third party in order to get back at the
offender, or to have the offender punished. (r=.24,
partial r=.19)
Talking the incident over with a neutral, uninvolved
third party, with no intent to harm the offender.
(r=.36, partial r=.33)
The latter item shows the strongest simple or partial correlation with
duration of any response item.
The final two responses in this category are ones aimed at quelling
the anger:
Trying not to think of the incident, avoiding thoughts
of the offender and what he or she did. (r=.20,
partial r=.19)
Engaging in calming activities (e.g., going for a walk,
watching t.v., etc.). (r=.13, partial r=.14)
Events During Episode
As will be recalled from the previous chapter, the present
questionnaire included a list of ten things which might transpire during
an episode of anger; subjects were asked to rate the degree to which
each one occurred during their anger on a three-point scale. No
attempt was made to construct an exhaustive list of possible events.
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Rather, nine of the items were selected to pursue an interest in bene-
ficial outcomes of anger; theoretical considerations suggested that
these nine would constitute important beneficial outcomes, and previous
research suggested that they ought to be relatively common. The tenth
event, the offender becoming angry at the subject, was included in
order to provide at least one common negative event.
The list of events, along with instructions to subjects, can be
found in Appendix A (pp. 115-116). The correlations between these
event items and duration, together with the corresponding partial corre-
lations with intensity partialled out, are presented in Table 7.
Five of the ten items correlate significantly with duration; in all
but five cases, the corresponding partial correlation is also signifi-
cant, but lower. Three of these five are the only three items of the
entire set of events which involve a third party. As we found in the
data concerning the subject's responses while angry, the involvement of
third parties is consistently positively associated with duration.
The remaining two items correlating significantly with duration
are:
You felt that you had less need or affection for the
offender than you had thought. (r=.24, partial r=.14)
You realized that what the offender did or said that made
you angry had more to do with his or her problems or
shortcomings than with anything about you. (r=.22,
partial r=.17)
Both of these items imply a kind of distancing from the target of
anger, a kind of cooling of the relationship, and the extent to which
this occurs shows a modest association with duration.
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Table 7
Correlations of Duration with Events During the Episode, and
Corresponding Partial Correlations with Intensity Partial led Out
Event
Mean
rating r_ Parti a
Instigating action attributed to
target's shortcomings 1.24 .22** .17**
Subject's determination to change
situation increased 1 .02 .07 .06
Third party agreement with subject 1 .00 .37** .27**
Target learned about subject's needs .91 .01 -.02
Target attempt to undo damage .60 .03 .00
Subject felt less affection for target .60 .24** .14**
i ai ye l ai j y r y at buujct L .57 .03a -.01 b
Target promise of no repetition .49 .01 -.07 b
Subject's image with third party
preserved .42 .21** .15**
Third party offer to help subject .41 .33** .25**
*p < .05
**p <
.01
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p< .05). See Appendix B.
b
Marginally-significant sex difference (p < .10). See Appendix B.
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Events as Termination Factors
The data in the present study bear on the termination of episodes
in two distinct ways. The first is based on self-report. Subjects
were asked to choose from a list of twelve possibilities the most
important factor in terminating their anger and to rate the entire set
of items as to their contribution to terminating the anger. The set of
items was composed of the ten "events" reported in the previous section
plus two additional items which were shown in previous questionnaire
studies to be important in the termination of anger (Averill, 1979a,
in preparation). Thus, though the items were not constructed to be
exhaustive or even fully representative of the factors in the termina-
tion of anger, the present study offers considerable self-report data
on termination.
Second, the study offers an alternative to direct self-report in
the specification of factors in termination. By employing the subjects
ratings of the occurrence of the ten events during the inital hour of
the long-term episodes, it is possible to establish tentatively the
connections between these events and the termination of anger. Essen-
tially, the method is to compare the ratings of the ten events during
the first hour of long-term episodes with the ratings of the ame ten
events over the entirety of episodes lasting less than one hour. Thus,
it is possible to discern negative or positive associations between the
occurrence of these events and termination, during the first hour at
any rate. In order to more fully explain this second approach
to the
specification of termination factors we will devote a section at
this
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point in the chapter to describing the analysis, its rationale, and the
results.
Discriminant analysis of events by termination
. To address the associa-
tion between the occurrence of the various events and the termination
of the angry episode, a discriminant analysis was carried out, employing
the ratings of events one hour after the initiation of the episode as
discriminating variables and forming the two groups to be discriminated
on the basis of whether the episode of anger was terminated within that
hour or not. All subjects rated the 10 events as of the termination of
their anger. In addition, those subjects whose anger lasted for one
hour or longer rated the same 10 events as of a point in time approxi-
mately one hour after the initiation of their anger (or approximately
one-half hour, if their anger lasted for only one hour). Thus, in a
sense, all subjects rated the events in their anger after approximately
one hour had passed from the initiation of the episode; in the case of
episodes lasting less than one hour, the episode had terminated by the
point at which the events were rated, while in the case of episodes
lasting one hour or more, the episode was not terminated at that point.
Ths discriminant analysis assesses the degree to which it is possible
to predict from these one-hour event ratings whether the episode was
terminated at that point.
The group of terminated episodes was composed of the 84 subjects
whose anger lasted less than one hour. The group of non-terminated
episodes was composed of 146 of the subjects whose anger lasted one
hour or more; the remaining five subjects reporting episodes of one
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hour or more neglected to rate the first-hour events.
The ten events ratings were able to discriminate between terminated
and non- terminated episodes to a degree which was statistically signi-
ficant (Wilk's lambda=.82, chi-square=45.3, d.f.=10, p<.0001). Of
the 230 cases, 157 (68%) were correctly classified by the discriminant
function; 101 were correctly classified as non-terminated, and 56 were
correctly classified as terminated. The canonical correlation between
the discriminant function and group membership was .43. Thus, there
appears to be some degree of association between the occurrence of
these events in the first hour of an episode and the termination of the
episode in less than an hour.
A stepwise regression procedure was employed to determine which of
the events are associated with termination. Five of the ten showed a
statistically significant association. Three of the five show a
positive relationship with termination (i.e., they tend to be rated
higher in the terminated episodes than in the non-terminated episodes).
These are:
Learn Needs— "The offender learned about your personal needs
and desires, and/or you felt that his or her respect for
these needs and desires was increased."
Take Back— "The offender 'took back' what it was that made
you angry, or tried to undo the damage that was done."
No Repeat— "The offender told you that 'it won't happen
again,' that he or she wouldn't repeat the action which
made you angry, or gave you other reason to believe that
the action would not be repeated."
The remaining two events show a negative relationship with
termination
(i.e., they tend to be rated higher in the non-terminated
episodes than
in the terminated episodes). These are:
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Less Affection— ''You felt that you had less need or
affection for the offender than you had thought."
Others' Help— "One or more people (apart from the
offender) agreed to help you improve the situation
and/or prevent the action which angered you from
being repeated."
The three events with a positive association with termination show a
substantial degree of mul ticoll ineari ty ; that is, each of them shows
a substantial positive correlation with the other two (r's range from
.46 to .59) and therefore their predictive power is confounded. "Learn
Needs" shows the highest simple correlation with termination (r=.29),
and it makes a statistically significant contribution to prediction even
when the other two events are included in the equation. "No Repeat"
makes a significant independent contribution when "Take Back" is
included in the equation, but not when "Learn Needs" is included.
Finally, "Take Back" makes a significant contribution only if it is
included in the equation before the other two. The two events with a
negative association with termination are also affected by mul ti coll ine-
arity; even though their correlation with each other is relatively low
(r=.27), "Other Help" makes a significant contribution to prediction
only if it is included before "Less Affection."
There is no indication of important "suppression" effects among
the five predictor variables; that is, the correlations among the
predictors and termination are not patterned such that the predictive
power of any of the predictors is increased when one or more of the other
predictors is added to the equation.
Self-report of termination factors. As with instigations, subjects
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indicated the factors responsible for the termination of their anger in
two ways. First, they chose the single factor which was "most important"
in terminating their anger, and second, they rated the contribution of
each factor to the termination of their anger on a three-point scale.
There were twelve termination factors for subjects to choose from and
rate. These consisted of the ten "events" items and two additional
i terns
:
You discovered, or were convinced, that your anger was
unfounded or unjustified; that is, you found out that the
event wasn't really one which should make someone angry,
or you realized for some other reason that you had no
right to be angry.
You engaged in calming activities, like going for a
walk, trying not to think about it,* etc.
Subjects also had the option of specifying another termination factor
in their own words, whether or not it was the most important one.
The number of subjects endorsing each termination factor as most
important, and the mean ratings of the contribution of each factor,
are presented in Table 8.
Table 8
Number of Subjects Endorsing Each Termination Factor as Most Important;
Means and Frequencies of Contribution to Termination (N=235)
Most Percentage
Important "somewhat" Mean
Termination Factors (N=227) or "very much" (Scale
You realized that what the offender did or
said that made you angry had more to do with
his or her problems or shortcomings than
with anything about you. 51 73% 1.14
You discovered, or were convinced, that your
anger was unfounded or unjustified; that is,
you found out that the event wasn't really
one which should make someone angry, or you
realized for some other reason that you had
no right to be angry. 30 40% .51
The offender learned about your personal
needs and desires, and/or you felt that his
or her respect for these needs and desires
was increased. 26 60% .85
Your determination to change the situation
which led to the action which angered you was
increased, or your confidence that you could
do so was Increased. 24 71% .97
You engaged in calming activities, like going
for a walk, trying not to think about it, etc. 23 62% .16
One or more people (apart from the offender)
agreed with you that you had been treated
badly or wrongly, and/or that you had a
right to be angry. 20 56% .83
The offender (i.e., the person you were
angry at) "took back" what it was that made
you angry, or tried to undo the damage that
was done. 14 43% ,56
The offender told you that "it won't happen
again," that he or she wouldn't repeat the
action which made you angry, or gave you
other reason to believe that the action
would not be repeated. 12 38% - au
You felt that you had less need or affection
for the offender than you had thought. 11 35% .51
Your image with one or more people (apart
from the offender) was improved, and/or mis-
conceptions which may have arisen in the
other peoples' eyes as a result of the
action which angered you were corrected or 37
prevented. J
One or more people (apart from the offend-
er) agreed to help you improve the situa-
tion and/or prevent the action which angered 41
you from being repeated.
The offender became angry or hostile toward <33
you
.
, 11 8% 2.00
Other (please specify) 11
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
In the present chapter, the results reported in the previous
chapter will be drawn together and their implications assessed. The
issues and concepts which were discussed in the first chapter will be
raised again here, insofar as the data help to clarify them or, con-
versely, insofar as the conceptual framework developed in the intro-
ductory chapter helps to clarify the empirical results.
Duration
The present study demonstrates clearly that episodes of anger
often last for a substantial period of time. Most of the episodes
reported here lasted for one hour or more (64% of the sample); many
lasted one day or more (40% of the total sample).
In the questionnaire studies which precede and inform the present
study (Averill, in preparation, Study I and Study II), subjects were
similarly asked to report the duration of episodes of anger. In one
instance subjects were reporting incidents of their own anger, while
in another instance subjects reported on an incident of anger in which
they were the target. The duration of anger reported by subjects in
each of these studies is presented in Figure 1, together with the dura-
tion results of the present study. In both the Averill studies the
results are roughly comparable to those in the present study, but some-
what lower: in the case of subjects reporting their own anger, the
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median response was just above "less than one hour" (i.e., more than
one-half hour but less than one hour) while in the case of subjects
reporting another's anger, the median response was just below "less
than one hour." 14 It seems probable that the difference in these
results is due to a difference in the wording of the question. In the
earlier questionnaires, subjects were asked, "How long did your (the
other person's) anger last when it first occurred ?" (emphasis added),
while in the present questionnaire the question read:
How long did your anger last? That is, how long was the time
period between when you first felt angry about this particu-
lar incident (or realized you felt angry about it) and when
you stopped feeling angry about it?
Since longer-lasting episodes of anger seem to consist of a series of
discrete periods of angry feelings some subjects whose own anger was
relatively lengthy, or who were the objects of long-term anger, may
have reported the duration of only the initial period of angry feelings
or interaction. In the case of subjects reporting their own anger,
there is the additional possibility that the lower duration was due to
the fact that the episodes of anger included anger which was directed
at non-human targets--animals and inanimate objects. It seems very
likely that anger at non-human targets tends to be of shorter duration.
How representative are these responses of the duration of anger in
general? The present study was carried out using a sample made up
exclusively of students, the great majority of whom were in their late
teens or early twenties. However, the earlier study investigating sub-
jects' own anger was based on a sample consisting of one-half students
and one-half older residents of a near-by community. The two groups
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did not differ significantly in the duration of their anger (Averill,
in preparation). So far as the wording of the question is concerned,
it would appear that the results of the present study may be more repre-
sentative, since subjects were asked to report the duration of the
entire episode.
Nonetheless, while the sampling of subjects does not appear to pose
a problem in these studies, the sampling of episodes is fairly clearly
biased toward episodes of longer duration. This is so for two reasons.
First, all three studies were retrospective; that is, subjects did not
monitor incidents as they occurred, as in a "diary" study, but rather
were asked to recall a single recent incident. The incidents selected
in this fashion are almost certain to be of longer duration than the
average of all episodes—other things being equal, longer-lasting anger
is likely to be more clear and conspicuous in one's recall. Second,
subjects who were able to recall more than one episode of anger from
the previous week were instructed to report on the most intense of these.
As will be recalled from the previous chapter, intensity and duration
are fairly strongly associated in the present study (r=.44); this was
true in the Averill studies as well.
A useful means of complementing the present retrospective findings
would be studies employing a diary method in which, ideally, respondents
report all episodes, regardless of duration. Unfortunately, diary
studies of anger (Richardson, 1981; Averill, in preparation, Ch. 11)
have not commonly reported the duration of episodes.
In any event, no claim is advanced here that most or all episodes
of anger last one hour or more. It seems perfectly reasonable to suppose
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that, in a strictly numerical sense, most episodes are relatively brief.
However, it is clear that anger episodes of substantial duration are by
no means rare or atypical, and that the more memorable, more intense,
and presumably, more important and consequential episodes tend to last
a relatively long time.
Correlates of Duration
It would be desirable to specify with assurance the determinants
of duration, the differential descriptive features of short and long
episodes, and the impact of duration on the outcome of anger episodes.
For a variety of reasons, however, such a detailed account is not possi-
ble at this point. The limitations of the present method have already
been mentioned (see Ch. I). Moreover, we have seen that the relevant
measures of association in the present study (primarily correlations),
even when statistically significant, tend to be rather weak. This may
be due to genuinely weak relationships, or it may, in some cases, be a
consequence of statistical properties of the scales that were employed.
Finally, this study has been a first effort in some respects, and it is
always possible that important factors were overlooked in its construc-
tion. Therefore, in the present section we are limited to a general and
tentative discussion of the correlates of duration.
Subject's age . The age of the subjects in this study showed a very
modest negative correlation with duration. The range of the subjects'
age in this sample is quite restricted; 91% of the subjects were between
18 and 22. Possibly this correlation would be higher in a more varied
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sample.
It may be that as people grow older they develop more effective
skills for bringing anger to rapid conclusion. Alternatively, the norms
for the duration of anger may change with age. That is, older people
may change their self-interpretations over time differently than younger
people, shifting their self-interpretations to a non-emotional sphere
at an earlier point. Nor are these two interpretations mutually
exclusive; to some extent, they may be two ways of saying the same
thing. Or, the effect of age in this sample could be mediated by other
factors—characteristics of interpersonal relationships, the nature of
instigations, etc. All of this is highly speculative at this point, how-
ever, since even the existence of the relationship is not well-established.
Periods of angry responses . There is a fairly strong correlation between
the duration of episodes and the number of discrete periods of angry
thoughts, feelings and behavior which comprise the episode. This corre-
lation adds substance to the logical assertion of the dispositional
character of anger and other emotions. Specifically, it helps to estab-
lish that longer-lasting episodes of anger consist of a series of
temporal ly-distinct occurrences.
Intensity . It has already been mentioned in the present chapter that
intensity is strongly correlated with duration not only in the present
study, but in both the Averill studies as well. What is responsible for
this relationship? It might be supposed that intensity is a causal
factor in duration, that the more intensely anger is aroused (at the
outset, presumably) the longer it takes to "dissipate." However, on
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the view of anger and other emotions on which the present study is
based, this explanation is unsatisfying. First, the notion of anger
"dissipating" depends, at least in part, on a concept of emotions as an
automatic, quasi -physiological process, rather than normati vely-based,
self-interpretive constructions. Second, the fact that anger is a
syndrome of related responses and not a single response or type of
response means that the intensity of an episode is not a simple, singu-
lar feature but rather a complex integration of a variety of features,
1
5
as judged by the angry person (Averill, in preparation, Ch. 11).
Thus, it does not seem to be the case that intensity causes duration.
The relationship seems to be more the reverse; duration may be one of
the features of an episode which is (often) subsumed in a judgment of
its intensity. That is, duration is partly "constitutive" of intensity.
There exists, in this sample, a substantial sex difference in the
correlation between duration and intensity. The correlation is consider-
ably stronger for women than for men. It would appear that women give
more weight to the duration of an episode in forming a judgment of its
intensity than do men. This may be a consequence of the cultural norm
that men are more "aggressive" than women, and presumably more forth-
right and active in the expression of anger. Whether or not this norm
is true in any simple and straightforward sense (and data on everyday
anger do not clearly support it; see Averill, in preparation, Ch. 13),
such a cultural norm could have an impact on the self-interpretations
of men and women. Specifically, men might base their judgments of the
intensity of an episode of anger on the "intensity" of expressive
responses,
16 largely without regard to the amount of time intervening
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between responses in an episode, while women place less emphasis on
responses and more on the amount of time involved.
Instigations
.
Among the three most common instigations in the study,
episodes instigated primarily by "frustration" (i.e., interruption of
an on-going or planned activity) tended to have the shortest duration.
The remaining two, "criticism" and "violation of relational expectations,"
had roughly equal durations.
To restrict our consideration for the moment to frustration and
violation of relational expectation, the difference in the duration of
episodes instigated in these ways may rest, in part, on a differential
involvement of norms of justice and fairness. Most episodes of anger
involve norms of justice, in some measure. It is rare for a person to
become angry at an action they consider fair and justified (Averill,
1979b); it is almost a contradiction in terms. However, when an insti-
gation is considered to be merely a "frustration," the assertion of
injustice seems to be weaker than when the instigation (possibly the
same "objective" action) is considered a violation of personal and/or
social norms concerning the obligations involved in a particular sort of
relationship. Once these stronger, or at least more specific, norms of
obligation are invoked, there would seem to be less likelihood that the
angry person will allow the incident to be forgotten without some
specific action, and this action may take some time to accomplish. This
explanation of the longer duration of episodes instigated primarily by
violation of relational expectation is consistent with the fact that
even when this factor is not chosen as the primary instigation, the
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ratings of its (secondary) involvement are positively correlated with
duration, suggesting that the more these norms are invoked in a person's
appraisal of an action, the longer the ensuing anger lasts.
This explanation does not seem to apply to the relatively long
duration of episodes of anger instigated by a personal criticism. After
all, a criticism is not necessarily unjustified, and it is quite possible
to be angered by a criticism without pausing to consider whether it is
correct. Of course, it may be that the anger aroused by personal criti-
cism is more often directed at the intent of the criticism or the manner
in which it is delivered than it is at the sheer untruth of the assess-
ment. However, one may speculate that an even more important factor
in the longer duration of anger instigated by criticism is the defensive
psychological function that might be served by such anger. Criticisms,
no matter how correct, are difficult to accept, difficult to incorporate
into one's self-concept (Losco, 1981). It may be that anger serves to
ward off such a psychological disruption or to forestall it until the
psychological work of accommodating a criticism can be accomplished.
Responses .
Immediate expression . There is a weak but statistically significant
relationship between immediate expression of anger to the target and
duration; where subjects expressed themselves immediately, the episode
tended to be of slightly shorter duration. Popular wisdom currently
holds that the direct expression of anger brings it to an end, and
several of the factors which contributed to the termination of the epi-
sodes in the present study would seem to be facilitated by direct
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expression, so we are not surprised to discover that immediate expression
is associated with shorter duration. However, the effect of immediate
expression on duration is confounded in the present sample with the
effect of instigations ; a two-way analysis of variance shows that the
predictive power of immediate expression drops out when the three main
instigations are included as a factor. Thus, part of the reason that
immediate expression is associated with shorter duration (to the limited
extent that it is in this sample) is that it is also associated with
the instigation--frustration--which is itself associated with shorter
duration. Whether frustration as an instigation leads to shorter epi-
sodes partly because the angry person is more likely to express his or
her anger immediately is impossible to say. (Actually, immediate expres-
sion is also associated to some extent with criticism as an instigation,
so it might be more accurate to say that delayed expression is associated
with violation of relational expectations as an instigation, among those
subjects who did express their anger to the target at some point during
the episode and who endorsed one of these three instigations as the most
important.
)
Thus, owing to the absence of an association between direct expres-
sion at any point during the episode and duration, and to the ambiguity
of the association between immediate expression and shorter duration,
it is not possible on the basis of these data to substantiate the
popular notion that forthrightness in the expression of anger brings the
anger to a more rapid close, and we will not attempt to deal further with
this specific issue. The discussions of subjects' responses and termina-
tion factors which follow below, however, do have an indirect bearing on
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the issue of expression and duration.
Specific responses
.
The correlations between duration and the
specific angry responses addressed in the questionnaire were presented
in detail in the previous chapter. A few general (and tentative) conclu-
sions can be drawn from these results.
At the outset, it is important to note a pertinent ambiguity in
the interpretation of the subjects' ratings of their actions and behav-
iors during the episode. Subjects were instructed to rate the "degree"
to which they did each of the responses at any time during their anger.
While to some extent they probably rated the absolute amount of time
they spent performing each response and/or the sheer vigor of the
response during this episode (relative to other times they had engaged
in the behavior or to the typical vigor of similar responses in other
people), it is also likely that to some extent they were rating the
amount of time spent on each response relative to the duration of the
episode, as a proportion, that is, of the total duration; similarly, they
may have rated the vigor of their responses relative to the overall inten-
sity of the episode, which would include, in addition to its duration
(see above), the vigor of the other responses. Thus, these ratings may
reflect an emphasis or predominance of a response as much or more than
they indicate the simple "degree" to which the action was performed or
the behavior engaged in.
In general, the results suggest that indirect, nonverbal means of
expressing anger and indirect means of coping with anger (i.e., means
which do not involve a direct confrontation with the target) tend to
increase and/or become more predominant as the duration of the episode
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increases, while direct, verbal expression either does not increase or
does not become more predominant with an increase in duration.
Of the four response items which involve explicit communication
with the target, two are not correlated at all with duration ("scolding
the offender..." and "talking the event over with the offender without
exhibiting hostility") and two show low simple correlation with duration
and are uncorrelated with duration once intensity is partialled out
("making nasty remarks, calling the offender names..." and "Emphatically
pointing to the damage done by the offender..."). Two possibilities
suggest themselves. Either direct verbal communication tends to occur
only at the outset of an anger episode, or it occurs at various points
in the episodes but does not come to predominate more as duration
increases. In either case, it may be said in a general way that the
direct expression of anger does not specifically characterize longer-
lasting episodes.
There is a modest correlation between duration and "thinking about
and planning a confrontation " Assuming that at least some of these
planned confrontations eventually occur, this correlation may incline
us toward the latter interpretation of the relationship between duration
and verbal communication. That is, these direct confrontations may occur
late in the episode as well as early, but they do not assume greater
importance in the longer-lasting episodes than in shorter ones.
Another important group of responses are those which might be
called "avoidant" responses, aimed at directly undercutting one's own
anger. Three of the items in the present study fall into this category,
and their relationship with duration is ambiguous. One of the three
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("trying to talk yourself out of feeling angry") is uncorrelated with
duration, while the other two ("trying not to think of the incident..."
and "engaging in calming activities") show low but significant correla-
tions with duration. Evidently avoiding thoughts of the incident and
engaging in calming activities are more frequent responses in longer-
lasting incidents, for one or more of several reasons: there may be
more opportunity for these responses with longer duration (though this
applies almost equally to all types of responses); they may be resorted
to later in the episode, after other means of coping have failed; or,
they may be largely unsuccessful means of coping, so that, when they
are the chosen means of coping, an episode tends to last longer. The
converse may be said of trying to talk oneself out of feeling angry;
that is, it may tend to be confined to the early part of an episode,
and/or it may in some cases be a successful means of terminating anger.
Three of the response items constitute a kind of indirect expres-
sion of anger to the target. They are: "denial or removal of some
benefit customarily enjoyed by the offender," "showing your displeasure
by withdrawing from the situation" and "crying."
17
Again, ambiguities
present themselves. All three are correlated moderately with duration.
This type of expression may be resorted to late in the episode, or it
may occur equally often early in the episode without contributing as
much as other types of response to the termination of the episode.
Finally, there is the response of talking the event over with a
third party, which is divided into two items depending on the intention
("to get back at the offender" or "with no intend to harm the offender").
Both are correlated with duration. This is a response which clearly
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depends on duration; one would not have much opportunity to engage a
third party in an episode of short duration. The results suggest that
this opportunity is often utilized in longer-lasting episodes, at least
without intent to harm the target. (Telling a third party in order to
retaliate against the target is a rare response regardless of duration.)
Termination factors . One is prompted by a consideration of duration
and other temporal aspects of anger to devote more attention to the
termination of anger than has typically been devoted to it in theories
of emotion, which have tended to focus largely or entirely on the
el i citing conditions of emotions. Our application of the concept of a
structured episode to emotions suggests the importance of an empirical
assessment of terminations. The present paper's emphasis on the duration
of anger in particular provides another rationale for an exploration of
the factors in the termination of anger; while the duration of a given
episode of anger has a large and varied number of determinants, the
"effective cause," in the simplest sense, of the duration of an episode
is the set of factors responsible for bringing the episode to an end.
In this section we will discuss the factors which the data indicate
are of particular importance in the termination of anger.
The two types of data and analysis regarding termination—direct
self-report and discriminant analysis of the occurrence of the ten
events--di verge somewhat in what they tell us about termination factors.
We will begin with a consideration of the two on which only self-
report data are available, then go on to consider the factors which one
or both forms of analysis suggest are important.
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The two items which were included only in the set of self-report
termination items are activities on the part of the subject which
directly and specifically concern the termination of anger. First,
there is the re-evaluation of the instigating situation as one in which
anger is inappropriate. Thirty subjects (13%) cited this re-appraisal
as the most important factor in the termination of their anger, the
second largest number of such endorsements in this sample. On the
social constructivist view of anger, all terminations of anger episodes
involve some such re-appraisal of the appropriateness of anger, or,
more precisely, a shift of self-interpretation out of the anger schema
and into some other schema, most probably a non-emotional one. What
makes the simple re-evaluation presently under discussion unique is
that it is not occasioned by any readily identifiable change in the
stance of the target person or any other aspect of the situation. It
is as if the angry person for some reason decides that, on reconsidera-
tion, the adoption of the angry role under the prevailing circumstances
was untenable, indefensible, or for some other reason undesirable, and
wishes to withdraw his or her commitment to that role.
The second of the two solely self-report termination factors is
"calming activities." These calming activities were cited as the most
important factor in termination by 23 subjects (10%), and 145 subjects
(62%) said that these activities were "somewhat" or "very much" involved
in bringing their anger to an end. Interpretation of this item is
complicated somewhat by the fact that two rather disparate examples
were provided on the questionnaire: "going for a walk" and "trying not
to think about it." (In a similar item in the responses section the
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examples were more homogeneous: "going for a walk" and "watching t.v.").
On a traditional view of anger, the terminating influence of calming
activities in a narrow sense (going for a walk, watching t.v., having
a drink, meditating, etc.) would seem to be unproblematical , since
that view tends to regard anger as consisting of, or at least fully
dependent on, physical agitation. However, in the present paper we have
adopted a view of anger as a structured self-interpretation of a syndrome
of responses which may (or may not) include physical agitation. On such
a constructi vist view, a reduction in physical agitation does not consti-
tute, or bring about in an unmediated way, a reduction in anger. Again,
the termination of anger, on the constructivist view, consists of a
shift in self-interpretation away from the anger schema. Where calming
activities in a narrow sense are an important factor in termination, the
impact of these activities on the angry person's self-interpretation is
probably mediated by his or her (socially-based) belief that anger is
a physical agitation, and therefore that a deliberate reduction in this
agitation will cause the cessation of anger. In other words, the impact
of calming activities is in some cases mediated by the angry person's
adoption of something like the traditional view of anger.
That the reduction of physical agitation cannot always be directly
responsible for the cessation of anger even in cases where calming
activities are considered the most important element in termination is
made obvious by the fact that, among the 23 subjects citing calming
activities as the most important termination factor, only 9 reported
episodes which lasted less than one hour, and only 4 reported that their
anger was uninterrupted from start to finish. In the case of episodes
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of relatively long duration and/or which consisted of more than one
"period" it seems clear that even where subjects attributed the cessa-
tion of their anger primarily to a reduction in physical agitation,
such a reduction cannot have been directly responsible. 18 It seems
implausible to suppose that in such cases the angry person's agitation
remains at a constant, high level throughout the hour or more of the
episode and/or throughout the gap(s) between periods of angry response,
only to be reduced by means of deliberate calming activities. An al-
ternative account, consistent with a constructivist view, is that these
calming activities are only effective in terminating anger when they
are part of a deliberate effort to end anger, and thus form an element
19
of self-interpretation.
We will now turn to the set of items which were among the self-
reported termination factors and which were analyzed by means of the
discriminant analysis, selecting for discussion those factors which one
or both forms of analysis indicate are important in termination. It may
aid the reader's comprehension if we recap briefly the form of the
discriminant analysis. This analysis, it will be recalled, compared
subjects' ratings of the events over the entire course of episodes last-
ing less than one hour with ratings of the same ten events over the
first hour of episodes lasting one hour or more. Thus, with the time
period held (roughly) constant, the analysis assessed which of the ten
events discriminated, in this sample, between episodes which were still
in progress and episodes which had terminated, providing an indication
of which events are associated (positively or negatively) with termination
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within one hour.
One event which both the self-report and the discriminant analysis
support as of frequent importance in the termination of anger is the
target's learning about, or better acknowledging, the needs of the
angry person. The item reads as follows:
The offender learned about your personal needs and
desires, and/or you felt that his or her respect for
these needs and desires was increased.
Twenty-six subjects (11%) considered this the most important factor in
the termination of their anger; in the discriminant analysis, the
occurrence of this event within one hour of the instigation of an anger
episode v/as the single strongest predictor of termination within one
hour. Two closely-related events which were also associated with the
termination of some episodes may be mentioned here. The target's
"taking back" the offending action or trying to undo the damage he or
she had done was endorsed by 14 subjects (6%) as the most important
factor in termination, while 12 subjects (5%) said that the target's
offering assurances that the offending action wouldn't be repeated was
the most important element. In the discriminant analysis both of these
events emerged as ones associated with termination, but their association,
in both cases, is largely confounded with that of the target's learning
the subject's needs, with which they are both highly correlated.
It is not surprising that direct conciliatory responses from the
target— an attempt to undo the damage or an assurance that the offending
action will not be repeated—can be effective in terminating anger and
are sometimes cited by the angry person as the most important factor in
the termination. What is perhaps somewhat surprising is that the more
88
general, perhaps less explicit acknowledgment of the angry person's
personal needs emerges as a more important factor. Partly this is to
be accounted for by the fact that it is a considerably more common
occurrence than either of the more specific conciliatory responses, but
this fact does not account entirely for the greater frequency of its
endorsement as the most important termination factor, since, in 19 of
the 26 cases in which it was cited as most important the subject
reported that one or both of the more specific responses had occurred
at least somewhat, and moreover it does not account for the stronger
association between this general acknowledgment and termination observed
in the discriminant analysis. It would appear that an acknowledgment of
the validity of one's needs and desires (specific to the instigation
and/or general) often counts as a satisfying response to anger, and any
future studies of the aims and terminating conditions of anger should
include a consideration of this factor.
According to the subjects' self-report, the event most often of
primary importance in the termination of their anger was their attribution
of the instigating action to the target's problems or shortcomings.
Fifty-one subjects (22%) considered this the most important element,
and in the separate ratings of the contribution of the various termination
factors, 171 subjects (73%) said that this event contributed at least
somewhat to the termination of their anger. The interpretation of this
item is unfortunately somewhat ambiguous. A few subjects seem to have
used it to indicate a kind of pitying response, a re-evaluation of the
blameworthiness of the tartet's actions in light of his or her (the
target's) frailties. However, subjects' written comments suggest that
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they more often had in mind a denigration of the target, a reduction of
that person's stature or a low estimate of his or her character. It
is somewhat puzzling that this response should be such a frequent
element in the termination of anger, since it seems itself to be an
angry response, not one which would provide a termination to an anger
episode. It may be that many of the subjects rating this event as the
most important element in the termination of their anger were describing
a shift in their self-interpretation from an emotional schema to an
atti tudinal one, such that the transitory nature of the negative judg-
ments of anger has ostensibly been exchanged for the more established
nature of an atti tudinal judgment. (This ostensible shift in the nature
of the judgment might play a part in subjects' self-interpretations with-
out constituting a genuine change; it would be a separate question
whether a lasting lowering of esteem had indeed occurred.) This inter-
pretation of the subjects' reports seems especially plausible in those
instances where the target is obdurate, where he or she does not
offer a conciliatory response to the subject's anger. The subject would
in effect be saying that there is no point in being angry, and would be
blaming the target for this unsatisfying state of affairs.
In those cases where the response makes a contribution to the
termination of anger without being the most important element, it may
be that subjects merely recognized the importance of attributions of
blame as a feature of anger, one which contributed to their ability to
take active steps toward the resolution of their anger.
Two remaining events were cited by an appreciable number of sub-
jects as being primary in the termination of their anger. Twenty-four
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subjects (10%) attributed the termination of their anger mainly to an
increase in their determination to change the situation from which the
instigation arose or in their confidence that they could do so, while
20 subjects (9%) cited the agreement of some third party that he or
she (the subject) was right to feel angry. Perhaps these events can
undercut the necessity for the passionate, agitated, irrational aspects
of the angry stance. When one has devised a promising course of action,
or when one is supported in one's desires by a third party, the speci-
fically emotional features of anger may no longer be required.
It is worth recalling at this point the distinction which was out-
lined in the first chapter between aim and terminating conditions . The
aim of a person's anger is what that person could be said to be seeking
as a satisfaction to their anger, while the terminating conditions
subsume all events which are capable of bringing the episode to a close.
The aim of an episode would be one terminating condition, assuming that
the anger is "in good faith;" that is, assuming that the angry person
is straightforward about the object of his or her anger. Certain of the
termination factors we have discussed could not sensibly constitute
aims: re-evaluation of the instigation, calming activities, attribution
of the offending action to the target's shortcomings, increased determina
tion to change the situation, and a third party's support would fall into
this category. On the other hand, the three conciliatory responses of
the target we have discussed—an attempt to undo the damage, an assur-
ance that the offending action will not be repeated, and an increased
acknowledgment of the angry person's personal needs-could easily
constitute aims of anger.
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Finally, there were two events which a few subjects reported as
contributing to the termination of their anger but which the discrimin-
ant analysis showed to be negatively associated with termination within
the first hour. Eleven subjects (5%) said that feeling less need or
affection for the target was the most important element in ending their
anger, and two subjects (1%) said that it was an offer from a third
party to help them improve the situation. However, the occurrence of
these events during the first hour of an episode was associated with
non-termi nation (though the effect of the latter was fully confounded
with that of the former).
These results are not particularly difficult to reconcile. First
we need to consider the association of the occurrence of these events
within one hour of instigation with longer duration. It is likely that
one requests the help of a third party in situations which are for one
reason or another difficult to resolve, and hence the anger spawned by
these situations is of longer duration. (This reasoning bears on the
general association we have observed between the involvement of third
parties and longer duration.) As for feeling less affection for the tar-
get, we might regard this as a possible feature of anger itself, an ele-
ment in the syndrome. It may be one, moreover, which indicates a
relatively serious matter, one which is not to be passed over lightly;
hence, the episode takes longer to terminate.
However, it is evidently possible for these same events to play a
role in the termination of anger, despite their association with longer
episodes. Perhaps they are resorted when other avenues of redress
result in failure. This could mean either that these events occur late
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in an intractable episode of anger--in desperation one turns to a third
party for help or comes to feel less affection for the target—or that,
regardless of when the events occur in the course of the episode, one
accepts them as the basis for a shift in self-interpretation when other,
more satisfying, events prove unobtainable.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The relationship between theory and data in the present study is
different than the relationship which customarily obtains in psychologi-
cal research. In the usual psychological research study—at least
ostensibly—one deduces hypotheses from previous theory and research,
and tests these hypotheses against data. In the present study consider-
able emphasis has been placed on original conceptualizations—primarily
the concepts of disposition and episode—which do not depend on the
data; in this sense the study is as much a theoretical one as an empiri-
cal one. The only empirical support necessary to the greater part of
the theory presented in the opening chapter is the mere fact that anger
and other emotions exist in time and in principle have a determinable
duration in any given instance. Largely because of a confusion of
occurrent and dispositional concepts, existing psychological theories
of emotion are incapable of accommodating this basic fact. Recognizing
that emotions are dispositional (and, by the same token, that the con-
cept of "state" is conceptually confused and inadequate as applied to
emotions) opens theway to a proper consideration of the temporal
dimension of emotions, but at the same time requires us to devise a new
means for distinguishing formally between emotions and other psychologi-
cal dispositions; in the present study the concept of episode is formu-
lated to meet this need.
The data which were gathered for the present study are applied here
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toward three ends: illustrating the concepts of disposition and
episode, differentiating descriptively between episodes of relatively
brief and long duration (without, for the most part, attempting to draw
conclusions about causality), and investigating the factors responsible
for the termination of anger. In discussing these data, concepts
associated with Averill's "social constructi vist" view of emotions were
applied. Implicit throughout this study is an assertion that the social
constructi vist outlook on emotions is capable of providing a more consis-
tent and illuminating account of the temporal dimension of anger than
any other psychological theory now available, as it is the only contem-
porary theory with sufficient flexibility, coherency and conceptual range
to accommodate the concepts and data presented here.
A number of fruitful avenues for further research on the duration
of anger may be discerned at this point. More detail could be added to
the description of short and long episodes; it is still unclear, on the
basis of the present study, whether there are systematic differences
in the content of short-term and long-term anger. Optimally, it would
be possible to organize the relationships between duration, background
influences, instigations, aims, categories of response, and termination
factors in a typology of episodes, each ideal type with its own progres-
sion of events over time. The detailed and reliable information necessary
to such an effort might be best gathered through the use of some sort
of diary method.
In a more theoretical vein, it would be useful to explore in more
detail the various influences on the duration of anger, and in
particu-
lar to re-conceptualize these influences in social constructi
vist terms,
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in a more systematic way than was attempted in the present study. The
notions of self-interpretation, reflective and pre-reflective self-
monitoring, and social norms have been invoked at various points in
this paper; these notions are in need of more precise definition, and
the account of the relations among them and their involvement in dura-
tion and other temporal characteristics of emotion could be substan-
tially refined. Such efforts might significantly advance our under-
standing of emotions.
FOOTNOTES
^ee Dennett (1978, Ch. 11) for a rich and perceptive analysis of
a similar conceptual incoherency in the ordinary concept of pain.
2
Rapaport used the word "affect" to stand equally for emotion and
feeling. See Rapaport, 1953, p. 177.
3
Just who or what receives this signal from the ego is an obscure
point in the theory; it seems to be the person . See Schafer, 1976.
4
For a philosophical analysis of emotion which employs the distinc-
tion between occurrent and dispositional concepts but which differs in
important respects from the present analysis, see Pitcher (1965).
Pitcher terms emotional episodes which are co-terminous with a response
or set of responses "occurrent" emotions, and reserves the term "disposi-
tional" for emotions which outlast any single period of responding:
If Paul was insulted by Jerome and is angry with him for
a week thereafter (although not, of course, actually feeling
angry all that time), he has a dispositional emotion during
that week. (p. 332, emphasis in original)
Thus, Pitcher invokes the crucial concept of a disposition, but does not
carry it far enough.
5
Some psychologists would be reluctant to employ ordinary language
concepts at any point in a theoretical endeavor, even in defining the
field of study, much less as technical or explanatory concepts, as is
here being proposed (cf. , Cattell, 1966; Mandler, 1979). One suspects
that the reluctance to adopt ordinary language concepts as topics for
psychological investigation has contributed substantially to popular
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disaffection and impatience with academic psychology. As to the use of
such concepts in an explanatory setting, the important issue is whether
they answer one's purposes; if so, the use of more technical concepts
would seem to be only gratuitous obfuscation.
6
In a study of "processes for ending social encounters," Albert
and Kessler (1976) describe the necessity for a "continuity process
(which) ... denies that the essential meaning of the encounter is one
which requires the physical copresence of the interactors" (pp. 164-
165). There is a similar necessity for demonstrating the continuity of
an anger episode across encounters between the angry person and the
target (and other relevant occasions), a necessity which could be met
by the consistent appearance of angry responses in consecutive encounters.
^The point-bi serial correlation is mathematically equivalent to
the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (Cohen and Cohen,
1975). Therefore, for the most part, no distinction is made in the
presentation of results between correlations involving a dichotomous
variable and those involving two continuous variables.
o
Sex differences in the everyday experience of anger, including
those in the present body of data, are reported and discussed by Frost
and Averill (Averill, in preparation, Ch. 13).
^There is a significant sex difference in the correlation between
duration and "relationship future" (the likelihood that the subject
would still be in regular contact with the target six months after
completing the questionnaire). For women, there is a weak but signifi-
cant negative correlation— the more likely it is that the subject would
be in regular contact with the target six months hence, the shorter the
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duration of her anger. For men, the correlation is positive
,
though
non-significant.
It is, of course, somewhat hazardous to interpret such weak
correlations, but it may be that women tend to be reluctant to persevere
in anger in a stable and well-established relationship.
°Recall here that for these correlations, where subjects left
the three-point scale for the instigation they endorsed as most
important blank , the item was treated as bearing a rating of "2," the
highest point on the scale.
^ There is a sex difference in the correlation between duration and
the degree of involvement of "criticism" in the instigation. For the
entire sample, the correlation is .10 (n.s.); for women, r=.19 (n=160,
p< .05), while for men, r=-.10 (n=75, n.s.).
Since, as shown in Table 5, episodes in which the primary instiga-
tion is criticism tend to be of relatively long duration, the question
here is not so much why women show a positive association between the
involvement of criticism and duration but why men do not .
12
There is a sex difference in the correlation between duration and
"making nasty remarks " Only women show a significant positive
correlation; for men, the correlation is slightly negative.
13
There is a significant sex difference in the partial correlation
between crying and duration. While women show the pattern described in
the text— a positive simple correlation between crying and duration, but
no corresponding partial correlation—among men there was a significant
partial correlation as well as a simple correlation between crying and
duration. However, it should be noted that only seven men (9%)
cried
during their anger, so that firm conclusions are difficult to draw.
14
Medians are reported here rather than means in order to control
for the fact that the duration scale in the present study was expanded
at the upper end, so that means from the two scales would not be directly
comparable.
15
Or as judged by anyone else involved. We don't have "privileged
access" to the intensity of our emotions, though we do know some rele-
vant facts that others can only guess at.
1 g
The "intensity" of a response would include its sheer physical
vigor, the reaction of others, the seriousness of its consequences, the
•degree to which it violates norms of civility and consideration, etc.
^Though the more detailed exploration of crying during anger for
which data were gathered with the present questionnaire is not relevant
to the issues in duration which are the main focus of the present
study, the results of this portion of the questionnaire may be briefly
summarized. First, far more women than men cried during their anger:
57 (34%) of the women versus 7 (9%) of the men cried at some point during
the episode they reported. Of the 57 women who reported crying, 55
answered the more detailed questions. Among these 55, 36% cried near
the beginning of the incident, 45% in the middle, and the remainder
near the end or at the resolution of the incident. Most of these women
regarded their crying as a sign of frustration (78%), sadness (64%), or
helplessness (55%). (Note that subjects were invited to check as many
of these meanings as were applicable.) Very few regarded it as a sign
of self-assertion, attack, resignation, defiance, or relief; fewer
than 15% endorsed any of these alternatives. Almost half the women (45%)
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cried in the presence of the person at whom they were angry, while 38%
cried alone. Only 9 women (16%) reported crying in the presence of
some person other than the target, and of these, 1 reported that the
target later found out about their crying.
Insofar as the impact of the subject's crying on the target of her
anger is concerned, the responses cited most frequently by women who
cried in the target's presence (or where the target found out later)
were attempts to comfort the subject (15), apologies (14) and a cessation
of arguing (11). Six or fewer targets reportedly left the subject by
herself, laughed at her, ignored her or became angry at her for crying.
1
8
We cannot know exactly how many of these 23 subjects actually
attributed the cessation of their anger to a reduction in physical
agitation, owing to the ambiguity of the questionnaire item. However,
the intent here is to provide an example to support the theoretical
points, not to assess the frequency of the particular scenario.
1 Q
In role terms, the person is enacting the role of an angry person
calming himself or herself down.
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PERSONAL ANGER SURVEY
In order to answer this questionnaire vou will need to think of a recent
time you were angry at someone you know personally; that is, a relative, friend,
roommate, acquaintance, but not a stranger or near-stranger. Select an incident
that occurred within the last week . If you became angry more than once within
the last week, choose the most Intense incident. If you did not become angry
at all during the last week, then choose the most recent incident, regardless
of how mild.
It doesn't matter how Long your anger lasted, whether it was for onlv a
few minutes or hours, days, or longer. However, It must be over now ; that is,
vou must no longer be feeling angry at this person over this specific action
or event. (This general issue may still be important to you, so long as vou
are no longer feeling angrv about this particular incident.)
Please be sure that the feeling you describe was really anger, rather than
n related but different feeling, like irritation, annoyance, resentment, etc .
Once you have thought of an Instance of anger, take a moment to think
about tho experience, brinaing to mind the details of the feeling, what caused
it, and the relevant circumstances. When these are vividly present for you,
turn the page and begin answering the questions.
What is Che relation of Che person you were angry at Co you? (Examples:
Acquaintance, classmate* roommate, friend, boyfriend or girlfriend,
professor, father, mother, brother, sister, etc.)
Is he or she male or female?
Male Female
Is he or she: (Check only one)
someone who had authority over you
(e.g., employer, parent, teacher, policeman, etc.)
someone over whom you had authority
(e.g., a child, employee, etc.)
an equal or peer
(e.g., friend, roommate, brother or sister, etc.)
At the time of the incident, how long had you known this person?
one week to one month
one to three months
three months' to one year
one to two years
two to five years
more than five years
What is the likelihood that you will still be in regular
contact with
this person six months from now? (Check one)
_! Wiu definitely not be in regular contact with this
person six
months from now.
r win probably not be in regular contact with this
person six months
from now.
£ have no idea whether I will be in
regular contact with this person
six months from now.
T probably will be In regular contact with
this person six months
from now.
X definitely will be in regular contact
with this person six months
from now.
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6. How often do you see this person? (Check the most appropriate.)
once or twice a year
several times a year
once or twice a month
once or twice a week
three to five times a week
practically every day, for a fairly brief period of time (about one hour)
practically every day, for an extended period of time (more than one hour)
7. How close or intimate is your relationship with this person? (Circle the
appropriate number.)
1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8: 9: 10
very very
close distant
108
(check one
item)
most
important
The following is a list of descriptions of various things which often make
people angry, any of which may have been involved in the event which angered
you. Read over the entire list and choose the one which was most important
In making you angry; place an in the space to the left of that item,
Then rate the involvement of all the items by circling one of the numbers
at the right of each item, using the following scale:
0 - not at all involved in what angered you
1 * somewhat involved in what angered you
2 very much involved in what angered you
A criticism of you, complaint or an insult.
Anything someone said to you which implied
a bad opinion of you or something you had done.
Something which exposed your faults or weak-
nesses to other people, potentially making
you look bad to these other people.
(Rate all items)
not
at all somewhat
1
very
much
10. Something which got in the way of something 0
vou were doing or planned to do, interfering
with some ongoing or planned activity.
11. An action which could have damaged something 0
belonging to you, or could have injured you
physically, but did not actually do so.
12. Actual physical damage to something of yours 0
or actual injury to you.
13. An action which was harmful in some way, or 0
could have been harmful in some way, Co the
person who did it. (This could include many
things, such as a physically dangerous action—
a child running into the street, for instance--
a socially inappropriate action that would be
harmful to the person doing it, etc.)
14. An action which was not in keeping with the
kind 0
of relationship vou have or would like to have
with this person, or with what you expect from
this nerson.
15. other (please specify)
0
Please describe in your own words Che action which angered you.
Even though you are no longer angry at this person over this incident, you
may or may not feel that the incident was fully resolved. Do you feel that
the incident was fully resolved?
Yes No
If not, why not?
With regard to the item that you marked "most important", is this the first
time that this person has done this particular action?
Yes No Don't Know
If this was not the first time, how often has this person done this action
before, to your knowledge, within the last month?
not within the last month
once
two or three times
more than three times
How many times have you gotten angry at this person tor doing this particula
action? (If the person has never done this action before— if you answered
"Yes" to #19— leave this question blank.)
never; this was the first time I got angry about it
once
two or three times
more than three times
more than three times
no
22. How many times have you let this person know that you don't like this
action or that you don't wane him or her to do it again, regardless of
whether you were angry at the time? (leave blank if answer to #19 is "Yes")
never
once
two or three times
more than three times
23. How long did your anger last? That is, how long was the time period between
when you first felt angry about this particular incident (or realized you
felt angry about it) and when you stopped feeling angry about it?
less than 5 minutes
5-10 minutes
_less than 4 hour
less than 1 hour
1-2 hours
h day
1 day
2-3 days
4 days - one week
more than one week
24. How many days ago did the incident occur ?
25. How intense was your anger in this incident? (Circle the appropriate number.)
1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9: 10
very
mi Id
very intense
;
as angry as most
people ever become
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26. Sometimes when we're angry at someone for a length of time we don't actually
feel the anger constantly, without interruption; that is, there are periods
when we're occupied with other thoughts, feelings and activities, and we
don't actually feel our anger or see the person we're angry at. Thus,
sometimes an incident of anger can consist of a single, uninterrupted train
of thoughts and feelings, while other times it can consist of a series of
periods of angry feelings and/or interactions concerning the incident,
separated by periods during which the anger is not on our minds.
In the present incident, how many of these periods of angry thoughts,
feelings and/or interactions did your anger consist of?
one (that is, your anger was uninterrupted from start to finish)
two
three
four to five
six or more
27. Were you able to express your anger to the person you were angry at im-
mediately at the time you first became angry?
Yes No
28. lt_ not
,
why not? (Choose the one most appropriate.)
Because the person himself or herself was not present.
Because, though the person you were angry at was present, the two of
you were not alone.
Because you thought it would be better to wait until another time, since
the target of your anger was in a bad mood, pre-occupied with something
else, etc.
Because you thought it would be better to wait until another time, since
it wasn't a good situation to express your anger. (E.g., there wasn't
enough time to talk it over, etc.)
Because it wasn't worth the bother, or because your anger wouldn't have
done any good anyway.
Because it would be difficult, or socially inappropriate, for you to ex-
press anger at all to this person. (E.g., he or she is a professor.)
Other (please specify)
112
29. Please describe further in your own words why you did not express your
anger Immediately to the person you were angry at:
30. Old you ever , at any point during your anger, express your anger directly
to the person you were angry at?
Yes No
The following is a number of things you may have done while angry. Race
Che degree Co which you did each one ac any time during your anger, according
Co che following scale:
0 - noc at all; you didn't do ic ac all
1 somewhat; you did it CO a moderate degree
2 * very much; you did ic Co a great degree
noc very
ac all somewhac much
31. Denial or removal of some benefic customarily 0 12
enjoyed by the offender
32. Scolding che offender, accusing him or her of 0 12
wrongdoing.
33. Trying noc Co chink of che incident, avoiding 0 12
thoughts of che offender and what he or she
did.
34. Talking the incident over wich a neutral, un- 0 12
involved chird parcy, wich no incenc to harm
the offender.
35. Crying, coming to tears over the incident. 0 12
36. Making nasty remarks, calling the offender 0 12
names, generally expressing bad feelings or
ill will toward the offender.
37. Thinking about and planning a confrontation; 0 12
imagining ways to express your anger or re-
solve the incident.
38. Engaging in calming accivicies (e.g., going for 0 12
a walk, watching t.v., etc.)
39. Emphatically pointing to the damage done bv 0 12
the offender; pointing out the hurt he or she
inflicted on you or the problems he or she
caused you.
40. Telling a third party in order to get back at 0 12
the offender, or to have the offender punished.
41. Talking the event over with the offender without 0 12
exhibitine hostilitv.
42. Trying to talk yourself out of feeling angry. 0 12
43. Showing your displeasure by withdrawing from
the situation, wanting to be alone, or giving
the target of your anger the "cold shoulder".
0 1
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING FIVE QUESTIONS ONLY IF YOU CRIED AT SOME POINT DURING YOUR
ANGER (chac Is, if your answer co question #35, above, was "1" or "2"). IF YOU
DID NOT CRY AT ALL DURING YOUR ANGER, GO TO THE NEXT PAGE.
44. Ac what point in time in your anger did you cry?
near the beginning, close to the time you first became angry.
in the middle
near the end
at or following the final resolution
(If you cried more than once, place a "1" at the time you cried the most,
a "2" at the second most important time, etc.)
45. If you were to describe your crying in a word or a few words, would you
consider it a sign of: (Check as many as are appropriate.;
self-assertion or insistence ; aggression or attack ; frustration
giving in (resignation or submission) ; defiance ; sadness ;
helplessness ; relief ; other (please specify)
46. When you cried, was it: In the presence of the person at whom you were
angry ; in the presence of another ; or when you were alone ?
(check che one where you cried the most, if you cried more than once)
47. If you didn't cry in che presence of the person you were angry at, did he
or she find out about it later?
Yes No Don't Know
48. What effect did your crying have on the person you were angry at? That is,
what did he or she do in response? (Mark as many as are appropriate. If
the person never knew you cried, skip this quescion.)
He or she apologized for Che incident that made you angry.
He or she scopped arguing, or liscened beCCer to what vou were saying.
He or she turned away or left you by yourself.
He or she laughed at you for crying.
He or she comforted vou, tried to make you feel better.
He or she became angry at you for crying.
He or she ignored the fact that you were crying.
49. Everything considered (the nature of the instigation, your responses to
it, the consequences of your anger, etc.). Co what extent was this episode
of anger adaptive (beneficial) vs. maladaptive (harmful)? (Circle the
appropriate number.)
-2
maladaptive,
harmful
0
neutral
+2 +3
adaptive,
beneficial
The following is a list of things which may have happened during your anger,
up to and including the point when you stopped being angry. For each one,
please answer the question, "To what extent did this happen at any point
during your anger?", by circling a number according to the following scale:
0 - not at all
1 =* somewhat; it took place to some extent
2 very much; it took place to a considerable extent
Do not be concerned about whether or not these things happened as a result
of your anger, or about whether or not they had anything to do with bringing
your anger to an end . As far as possible, simply indicate which of them
happened (if any), and to what extent.
To what extent did each of these happen while you were angry?
not
at all
50. The offender (i.e., the person you were angry
at) "took back" what it was that made you angry,
or tried to undo the damage that was done.
51. The offender told you that "It won't happen
again", that he or she wouldn't repeat the
action which made you angry, or gave you
other reason to believe that the action
would not be repeated.
52. One or more people (apart from the offender)
agreed with you that you had been treated
badly or wrongly, and/or that you had a right
to he angry.
51. One or more people (apart from the offender)
agreed to help you improve the situation and/
or nrevent the action which angered you from
be ing repeated.
54. Your image with one or more people (apart from
the offender) was improved, and/or misconrentions
whirh may have* arisen Ln other peopLes' eves as
j result of the action which angered you were
corrected or prevented.
somewhat
1
very
much
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not
at all somewhat
very
much
55. Your determination to change the situation 0
which led to the action which angered you
was increased, or your confidence that you
could do so was increased.
56. The offender learned about your personal needs 0
and desires, and/or you felt that his or her
respect for these needs and desires was increased.
57. You felt that you had less need or affection for 0
the offender than you had thought.
58. You realized that what the offender did or said 0
that made you angry had more to do with his or
her problems or shortcomings than with anything
about you.
59. The offender became angry or hostile toward you. 0
60. Other (please specify)
The list will now be repeated (with two additional items) and this time you
are to answer the question, "To what extent did each of the following con-
tribute to bringing your anger to and end?" First choose the one which was
most important in bringing your anger co an end; place an "x" to the left
of that item. Then rate the contribution of all the others by circling
a number according to Che following scale:
0 not at all; contributed nothing to bringing your anger to an end
1 * somewhat; contributed moderately to bringing your anger to an end
2 very much; contributed a lot to bringing your anger to an end
To what extent did each of che following contribute to bringing your anger
co an end?
(check one
item)
TtOSt
important
(Rate all items)
not
ac all
verv
somewhat much
61, You discovered, or were convinced, that your
anger was unfounded or unjustified; that is,
you found out that che event wasn't reallv one
which should make someone angry , or you realized
for some other reason that you had no right to
be angry.
(check one
icem> (Rate all items)
most noc very
important aC a11 somewhat much
62. You engaged in calming activities, like going 0 12
for a walk, trying not to think about it, etc.
63. The offender (i.e., che person you were angry 0 12
at) "took back" what it was that made you angry,
or tried to undo the damage that was done.
64. The offender told you that "it won't happen 0 12
again", that he or she wouldn't repeat the
action which made you angry, or gave you
other reason to believe that che action
would not be repeated.
65. One or more people &part from che offender) 0 12
agreed with you Chat you had been creaced
badly or wrongly, and/or Chat you had a
right co be angry.
66. One or more people (apart from the offender) 0 1 2 •
agreed to help you improve Che situation and/
or prevent the action which angered you from
being repeated.
67. Your image wich one or more people (apart from 0 12
che offender) was improved, and/or misconceptions
which may have arisen in ocher peoples' eyes as
a result of the action which angered you were
corrected or prevented.
68. Your decerminacion Co change che sicuacion 0 1 2
which led Co Che accion which angered you
was Increased, or your confidence chac you
could do so was increased.
69. The offender Learned abouc your personal needs 0 12
and desires, and/or you felc Chat his or her
respect for chese needs and desires was increased.
70. You felt chac you had less need or affeccion for 0 12
Che offender Chan you had chought.
71. You realized chac what Che offender did or said 0 12
chac made you angry had more Co do wich his or
her problems or shortcoming? Chan wich anything
abouc you.
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(check one
lteo> (Rate ail items)
most not very
important at all somewhat much
72. The offender became angry or hostile toward you 0 12
73. Other (please specify) 1 2
74. Briefly describe what tt was that brought your anger to an end, and how.
75. Is there any way or ways that your anger brought benefit to you or other
people?
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ONLY IF YOUR ANGER LASTED ONE HOUR OR MORE
(#23, above). IF YOUR ANGER LASTED LESS THAN ONE HOUR, GO DIRECTLY TO THE
TOP OF PAGE 16.
Think back now to a point approximately one hour after you first became
angry. (If your anger lasted for one hour total, think back to a point
approximately one half hour after you firsc became angry.)
The following is a list of things which may have taken place during the
time period up to and including this point in your anger. For each one,
please indicate to what extent it happened, during this time period only,
according to the following scale:
0 - not at all
1 somewhat; it took place to some extent
2 very much; it took place to a considerable extent
It is important that you distinguish as clearly as possible between what
happended during this first period of your anger and what happened later,
and that you indicate here only what happened during this first period.
not very
at all somewhat much
76. The offender (i.e., the person you were angry 0 12
at) "took back" what it was that made you angry,
or tried to undo the damage that was done.
77. The offender told you that "it won't happen 0 12
again", that he or she wouldn't repeat che
action which made you angry, or gave you
other reason to believe that the action
would not be repeated.
.
78. One or more people (apart from the offender) 0 12
agreed with you that you had been treated
badly or wrongly, and/or that you had a
right co be angry.
79. One or more people (apart from the offender) 0 12
agreed Co help you improve che situation and/
or prevent the accion which angered you from
being repeaced.
80. Your image with one or more people (apart from 0 L 2
che offender) was improved, and/or misconcepcions
which may have arisen in other peoples' eyes as
a result of che action which angered you were
corrected or prevenced.
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not very
at all somewhat much
81. Your determination to change the situation 0 1
which Led to the action which angered you
was increased, or your confidence that you
could do so was increased.
82. The offender learned about your personal needs 0 1
and desires, and/or you felt that his or her
respect for these needs and desires was increased.
83. You felt that you had less need or affection for 0 1
the offender than you had thought.
84. Your realized that what the offender did or said 0 1
that made you angry had more to do with his or
her problems or shortcomings than with anything
about you.
85. The offender became angry or hostile toward you. 0 1
86. Briefly describe what had taken place up to this point.
87. Still in regard to this point in your anger, why would you say that your
anger had not yet come to an end by this time? (Check all that apply.)
You had not yet had a chance to talk to the offender about the issue.
The offender had not yet made the kind of response to your anger which
would bring it to an end.
Bringing your anger to an end required that the offender do something
in particular (for example, repair the damage that he or she had done)
and this cook a longer Cirae period.
It simply took you a longer period of time to let off steam or cool down.
Other (please spec Lfy)
88. Please explain in your own words why your anger had not yet come to an end.
Personal Information
1. How old are you?
2. What /ear are you in school?
Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior^
Ocher
3. What is your living situation?
Dormitory Apartment House
Do you live with your family or away from your family^
Are you
Male Female
Are there any comments you would like to make about this questionnaire
APPENDIX B
SEX DIFFERENCES IN CORRELATIONS WITH DURATION
In the following tables the correlations with duration presented
in Chapter III, above, are broken down by sex. For each table in
Chapter III containing correlations with duration—Tables 2, 3, 6,
and 7--two tables are provided in the present appendix, one table
for each sex. Individual correlations which differ significantly from
zero are denoted by a superscript, as are pairs of correlations which
differ significantly by sex. (Sex differences are tested using the
Fisher r-to-z' transformation.)
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Table 11
Correlations of Background Factors of the Episode With
Duration, and Partial Correlation (Intensity Partial led Out)
Men Only
Variable
Item No. in
questionnaire N
Correlation
with duration Partial
Relationship
With Target
Authority
Intimacy
Relationship
Past
Relationship
Future
Frequency of
Contact
History of
Offense
First Time
Done Before
Angry Before
Complained
Before
19
20
21
22
75
75
75
75
75
74
48
47
46
-.02
-.01
-.00
.13'
-.26
.05'
.10
.01
.08
.02
.01
.00
.17
.26
.01
.10
.02
.05
*p < .05
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p<.05)
bMarginally-significant sex difference (p < . 10)
.
Table 12
Correlations of Background Factors of the Episode With
Duration, and Partial Correlations (Intensity Partialled Out)
Women Only
Variable
Relationship
With Target
Authority
Intimacy
Relationship
Past
Relationship
Future
Frequency of
Contact
History of
Offense
First Time
Done Before
Angry Before
Complained
Before
Item No. in
questionnai re
Correlation
N with duration Partial
5
19
20
21
22
160
159
160
160
160
160
102
102
101
.06
.02
-.11
-.17:
-.05
12
u
21*
00
02
.06
-.03
-.05
-.06
-.07
08
23*
05
00
*p <
. 05
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p< .05)
bMarginally-significant sex difference (p < . 10)
.
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Table 13
Correlations of Duration with Responses While Angry, and Partial
Correlations with Intensity Partialled Out (N=75)-Men Only
Mean
Responses Ratings r Partial r
Direct expression to target
Scolding the offender, accusing him or her
of wrongdoing. .87 -.14 -.20*
Thinking about and planning a confrontation;
imagining ways to express your anger or
resolve the incident. .85 .17 .16
Emphatically pointing to the damage done by
the offender; pointing out the hurt he or
she inflicted on you or the problems he or
she caused you. .85 .14 .12
Talking the event over with the offender
without exhibiting hostility. ,76 .04 .00
Making nasty remarks, calling the offender
names, generally expressing bad feelings or
Trying not to think of the incident, avoiding
thoughts of the offender and what he or she
did.
Telling a third party
Talking the incident over with a neutral, un-
involved third party, with no intent to harm
the offender.
ill will toward the offender. .56 -.08" -.09
Indirect expression to target or others
Showing your displeasure by withdrawing from
the situation, wanting to be alone, or giving
the target of your anger the "cold shoulder." .87 .21* .20 :
Denial or removal of some benefit customarily
enjoyed by the offender .64 .16 .12
Crying, coming to tears over the incident. .09
a
.42*** .38
Avoidant responses
Trying to talk yourself out of feeling angry. .87 .12 .07
Engaging in calming activities (e.g., going
for a walk, watching t.v., etc.) -81 .17 .1/
75 .17 -17
95 .37*** .34**
Telling a third party in order to get back at
the offender, or to have the offender punished. .28 .15
.
*p < .10 **p< .05 ***P< .01
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p< .05).
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Table 14
Correlations of Duration with Responses While Angry, and Partial
Correlations with Intensity Partialled Out (N-160) - Women Only
Responses
Direct expression to target
Scolding the offender, accusing him or her
of wrongdoing.
Thinking about and planning a confrontation;
imagining ways to express your anger or
resolve the incident.
Emphatically pointing to the damage done by
the offender; pointing out the hurt he or
she inflicted on you or the problems he or
she caused you.
Talking the event over with the offender
without exhibiting hostility.
Making nasty remarks, calling the offender
names, generally expressing bad feelings or
ill will toward the offender.
Indirect expression to target or others
Showing your displeasure by withdrawing from
the situation, wanting to be alone, or giving
the target of your anger the "cold shoulder." •
Denial or removal of some benefit customarily
enjoyed by the offender.
Crying, coming to tears over the incident.
Avoidant responses
Trying to talk yourself out of feeling angry.
Engaging in calming activities (e.g., going
for a walk, watching t.v., etc.)
Trying not to think of the incident, avoiding
thoughts of the offender and what he or she
did.
Telling a third party
Talking the incident over with a neutral, un-
involved third party, with no intent to harm
the offender.
Telling a third party in order to get back at
the offender, or to have the offender punished.
Mean
Ratings
1.06
1.07
1.01
.76
.62
.90
.68
.49*
.87
.88
.66
99
24
.01
.22
.15*
.10
.28****
.19 1
.29
.23
.11
.11
22**'
35***
2g***
Partial r
-.06
.07
.06
-.05
.12
13
18*1
00
a
06
14*
21
34***
20***
*p <.10 **p <.05 ***p <-01
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p<.05)
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Table 15
Correlations of Duration with Events During the Episode, and
Corresponding Partial Correlations with Intensity Partialled Out
Men Only
Mean
Event rating £ Partial r
Instigating action attributed to
target's shortcomings 1.21 .17 .16
Subject's determination to change
situation increased 1.04 . .20 .17
Third party agreement with subject .93 .28* .23*
Target learned about subject's needs .87 .15 .11
Target attempt to undo damage .53 .12 ,09
Subject felt less affection for target .68 .24* '.22
Target angry at subject .69 -.17a -.18
b
Target promise of no repetition .47 .15 .10
b
Subject's image with third party
preserved .51 .14 .11
Third party offer to help subject .48 .28* .24*
*p < .05
**p < .01
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p<.05)
bMarginally-significant sex difference (p<.10).
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Table 16
Correlations of Duration with Events During the Episode, and
Corresponding Partial Correlations with Intensity Partial led Out
Women Only
Mean
Event rating r_ Partial r
Instigating action attributed to
target's shortcomings 1.26 .24** .17*
Subject's determination to change
situation increased 1.01 .01 .02
Third party agreement with subject 1.04 .41** .30**
Target learned about subject's needs .93 -.06 -.06
Target attempt to undo damage .63 -.01 -.04
Subject felt less affection for target .57 .25** .08
Target angry at subject .51 .14a .09 b
Target promise of no repetition .51 -.05 -.15
b I
Subject's image with third party
preserved .38 .25** .19*
Third party offer to help subject .38 .36** .26
*p < .05
**p < .01
aStatistically-significant sex difference (p< .05)
bMarginally-significant sex difference (p < . 10)
.

